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ABSTRACT
A large body of literature devoted to analyzing information control in China
concludes that we find imperfect censorship because the state has adopted a min-
imalist strategy for information control. In other words, the state is deliberately
selective about the content that it censors. While some claim that the government
limits its attention to the most categorically harmful content—content that may lead
to mobilization—others suggest that the state limits the scope of censorship to al-
low space for criticism which enables the state to gather information about popular
grievances or badly performing local cadres.
In contrast, I argue that imperfect censorship in China results from a precise and
covert implementation of the government’s maximalist strategy for information con-
trol. The state is intolerant of government criticisms, discussions of collective action,
non-official coverage of crime, and a host of other types of information that may
challenge state authority and legitimacy. This strategy produces imperfect censor-
ship because the state prefers to implement it covertly, and thus, delegates to private
companies, targets repression, and engages in astroturfing to reduce the visibility
and disruptiveness of information control tactics. This both insulates the state from
popular backlash and increases the effectiveness of its informational interventions.
I test the hypotheses generated from this theory by analyzing a custom dataset
of censorship logs from a popular social media company, Sina Weibo. These logs
measure the government’s intent about what content should and should not be cen-
sored. A systematic analysis of content targeted for censorship demonstrates the
broadness of the government’s censorship agenda. These data also show that delega-
x
tion to private companies softens and refines the state’s informational interventions
so that the government’s broad agenda is maximally implemented while minimizing
popular backlash that would otherwise threaten the effectiveness of its informational
interventions.
xi
CHAPTER I
Introduction: Delegation and Covert Censorship
in China
In March of 2018, popular social media company Sina Weibo was thrown into
chaos due to a bungled attempt to censor LGBT content on their platform. The
controversy began when Sina Weibo announced its intention to ban “gay-themed car-
toons, images, and video, citing “the Cyber Security Law of the People’s Republic of
China.” Surprisingly, other social media platforms did not make any such announce-
ments. The public responded forcefully. In China, discussions of LGBT rights are
becoming more commonplace and LGBT individuals are becoming more visible. At
the same time, the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rarely addresses the issue.
When it does, it is often vague or contradicted by another voice within the Party or
government. On Sina Weibo and other social networking sites, users posted hash-
tags such as #IAmGay and #IHaveGayFriends in protest of Sina’s decision. After a
swelling of public outrage, Sina Weibo reversed the policy. This reversal was followed
by an article in the state newspaper People’s Daily that criticized the platform for
its decision, asserting that homosexuality was not abnormal and urging regulators to
“exercise caution when cleaning up [the Internet] and make sure that they do not
confuse [non-illegal content with illegal content] when rushing to take action.”1
1Translation of the editorial can be found here: http://www.webcitation.org/71h6PuJyw
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What went on behind the scenes at Sina and in the government that resulted
in this sequence of events is difficult to discern. Did Sina Weibo decide to censor
LGBT issues in response to a government directive or did they self-censor? Why was
this decision not consistent across other social media platforms? Can the apparent
reversal of policy be explained by disagreements within government about how to
approach LGBT content? Did popular outrage affect the reversal of this decision?
While previous studies of censorship have focused solely on the end result: whether
content was censored or not, this event suggests that much more is going on in China’s
system of censorship.
In this dissertation, I break with prevailing explanations in the literature that sug-
gest the regime selectively censors a particular category of content. Instead, I argue
that the Chinese Government has broad and expansive censorship goals. Rather than
pursuing a selective, minimalist agenda for censorship, the regime seeks to covertly
implement a maximalist agenda for information controls. This maximalist agenda is
implemented covertly to reduce invasiveness and visibility of information control in-
terventions. Covert implementation of censorship increases the effectiveness of state
interventions and reduces state exposure to popular backlash. Delegation of censor-
ship to private actors facilitates compromise between the public demand for infor-
mation and the state’s preferences. Delegation also shifts blame over censorship to
private actors, insulating the state from backlash resulting from unpopular decisions
such as Sina’s decision to ban LGBT content.
To test hypotheses generated by this theory, I analyze the entire process of cen-
sorship, focusing on the many conflicts between individuals in state, society, and the
private sector that result in censorship decisions. This analysis shifts the spotlight
onto an often-neglected actor in China’s system of information control: the private
online media platform. State partnerships and delegation to private actors can make
censorship interventions more covert and more effective. Private companies are better
2
equipped to avoid controversy and target their censorship efforts, replacing the state’s
hammer with a scalpel.
1.1 The Puzzle of Imperfect Information Control In China
Many early works of the impact of the internet on the durability and resilience
of authoritarian regimes optimistically suggested that the internet would be a de-
mocratizing force. Scholars, politicians, and journalists focused on the liberalizing
effect of the internet, claiming that the internet was fundamentally unregulatable.
With hardware, software, law, and repression, the Chinese government has tamed
much of the internet in China and made early utopian and libertarian visions of the
internet seem misguided. Conversely, China’s success in the realm of internet infor-
mation manipulation makes works by Lawrence Lessig seem prophetic. He claimed
that eventually, the internet would be bounded and constrained by governments, pri-
vate interests, and more fundamentally by code—what Lessig considers a form of law
in cyberspace (Lessig , 1999). In China today, information control regulations are im-
plemented through code which governs and constrains human behavior and “guides
the opinions” of China’s 773 million netizens.
Certain websites—Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Google—are inaccessible
behind China’s Great Firewall, China’s first line of defense against “harmful content”
online. Within China’s borders, users experience an almost wholly domestic internet
that is bounded and controlled. Despite this, the internet within the Firewall is
not stagnant, nor is it devoid of a vibrant public sphere. One can find numerous
tribes of netizens who have staked claims to their own corners of the web. These
tribes invent memes, slang, and form coherent group identities. They can be critical,
supportive, or indifferent to the ruling CCP. Some tribes obsess over reality TV,
but others organize around local interests, confronting authorities with grievances.
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Some launch citizen investigations to expose local government corruption.2 Others
harass celebrities hoping for hush payments, shill for private companies, or do a little
of both.3 Some “voluntarily” participate in patriotic campaigns to spread ‘positive
energy’ in support of the government’s agenda4 while others do so as a means to a
government paycheck.5
While information controls in China are encoded into law, and physically and
virtually embedded into China’s network infrastructure, content explicitly deemed
harmful by the Communist Party routinely seems to fall through the cracks. In China,
a Leninist single-party autocracy, there is sufficient space for non-official organizations
to organize and for “harmful content” to spread. A vibrant, though constrained public
sphere appears to have emerged in China. This is puzzling because China arguably
has the most technologically advanced system of information control in the world.
How and why6 did this happen?
Scholars of the internet in China usually address this puzzle of “imperfect censor-
ship” in one of two ways. The first draws on social movements literature, claiming
that imperfect control of the internet results from the “cat and mouse game” between
state and citizen over who controls a contested public sphere. The second sees im-
perfect control as a minimalist government strategy, whereby the state is deliberately
2Ai Weiwei famously used the internet to aid in his citizen investigation of corrupt practices that
resulted in the deaths of schoolchildren during the Sichuan earthquake of 2003.
3China’s paid information manipulation efforts are massive, with a large amount of social content
created by what netizens call the “Water Army,” netizens who are paid to post comments for
businesses or celebrities. Some of these individuals will organize coordinated attacks on celebrities
hoping to receive hush money, others will post positive product reviews for companies, and some
will do a little of both. See http://www.webcitation.org/72Gl4uuBi
4Several groups of netizens appear to spontaneously brigade in opposition to China’s critics.
These netizens are sometimes called the “Volunteer Fifty Cent Party” or the “Little Pinks.” Dur-
ing the Taiwanese election, several of these individuals organized a campaign on Baidu Tieba to
circumvent censorship of Facebook and post pro-China messages on Tsai Ying-wen, Taiwan’s now
president’s Facebook page.
5See Chapter 5 for more on paid regime commentators, also known as astroturfers of the “Fifty
Cent Party.”
6Yawen Lei theorizes that the vibrancy of China’s public sphere is an inadvertent consequence of
efforts to modernize legal and media institutions within China’s authoritarian system. She claims
that as a consequence, citizens now have unprecedented opportunities to challenge the regime, or-
ganize around law, and influence policy (Lei , 2017).
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selective about the content that it censors. While some claim that the government
limits its attention to the most categorically harmful content—content that may lead
to mobilization—others suggest that the state limits the scope of censorship to al-
low space for criticism which enables the state to gather information about popular
grievances or badly performing local cadres.
The “cat and mouse game” argument posits that China’s public sphere has emerged
and expanded as a result of conflict between state (cat) and citizen (mouse) over who
controls a contested public sphere. Early scholars of information control in China
focused on the “mouse,” claiming that the “democratic” structure of the internet and
its technological affordances has empowered citizens to evade the state’s information
controls and expand non-official public spheres. Traditional one-to-many content dis-
semination was upended by the many-to-many relationships made possible by the
internet, “democratizing” content production and dissemination. New technologies
and modes of communication, these scholars argued, reduced the state’s ability to set
the agenda and shape political preferences (Diamond , 2010; Esarey and Xiao, 2011).
While these works are optimistic about the relative power of citizens, others point
out that the state has more control over the institutions and structures that govern
the internet—a unique advantage in the cat and mouse game between state and
netizen (Lessig , 1999; MacKinnon, 2009; Morozov , 2012). (Han, 2018) claims that
in addition to state control over the structures and institutions of the internet, both
regime supporters and regime opponents can take advantages of the public sphere
that exists in China. Regime supporters can also use online tools and platforms to
advocate on behalf of the state. The state’s benefits from the support of these social
groups as it can artificially increase the visibility of these groups, making it seem as
if the official position has broad popular support among ordinary people.
The second explanation for the emergence of China’s public sphere argues that
censorship is imperfect on purpose, and is a deliberate choice made by the state.
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Instead of focusing on state-society conflict, these scholars explore the determinants
of what is permitted and what is censored, theorizing about the government logic be-
hind these boundaries. Some claim that the only thing that is categorically off limits
is collective action content (King et al., 2013, 2014). Others claim that censorship is
strategically selective to facilitate “public opinion supervision” of local government
officials, that is, identifying corrupt or poorly performing local cadres through mass
surveillance of social media (Lorentzen, 2014; Dimitrov , 2017). Roberts claims that
the state knows it can’t perfectly censor, so it relies on “friction” and “flooding” to
control access to harmful content. She demonstrates that even though government
censorship does not expunge all non-official information, it makes finding this infor-
mation more difficult. She finds that these efforts are highly effective in influencing
Chinese netizens’ exposure to information.
1.2 Maximalist Censorship Strategy and Covert Implemen-
tation
In contrast to the aforementioned explanations, I argue that imperfect censor-
ship in China results from a precise and covert implementation of the government’s
maximalist strategy for information control. Despite the apparent imperfections in
censorship implementation, the state is intolerant of government criticisms, discus-
sions of collective action, non-official coverage of crime, and a host of other types of
information that may challenge state authority and legitimacy. In order for censor-
ship to be covert and more effective, the state adopts methods of implementation of
censorship that appear imperfect, but in reality are highly effective because they are
precisely targeted, constrained, and hidden. The state covertly advances its maxi-
malist censorship objectives in 3 ways.
First, the state delegates censorship to internet content providers (ICPs). ICPs
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serve as a mediator between the interests of the state and the interests of society.
Because ICPs weigh the costs of defying government directives with the benefits of
satisfying market demand for information, censorship outcomes reflect a compromise
between the state’s maximalist censorship objectives and society’s demand for infor-
mation. ICPs strategically respond to market demand for information, the actions of
competitors, estimations of the state’s capacity to monitor compliance, and the ex-
pected sanctions for non-compliance. This results in a maximization of the breadth
of censorship under market-informed constraints of what level of censorship society
will tolerate.
Second, the state targets information control and repression selectively to influen-
tial social actors. Selectively targeting information control, repression, and cooptation
to influential users reduces the average citizen’s propensity for experiencing informa-
tion control. At the same time, because influential individuals generate most of the
content online, this strategy achieves a sizable reduction in the visibility of harmful
content. This strategy works because it is incentive-compatible with ICPs’ desire to
reduce disruptiveness of information controls to their users. The government can rely
on social media companies to identify and report influential users to them and to
prevent censorship of users from being widely observed.
Third, the state engages in widespread astroturfing—production of pro-government
content by government employees who are masquerading as “grassroots” individu-
als—to covertly influence perceptions of popular support for the state’s positions.
Astroturfing suppresses the speech of individuals with non-official opinions and artifi-
cially increases the share of official opinions. This is accomplished covertly—without
implicating the state as the propagandist behind the content. Even though some of
this content may be identifiable, the state can plausibly deny authorship.
While it may appear that information controls are incomplete when observing
the outcomes of interventions, they are incomplete for a reason. The state benefits
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from the selectivity of delegated censorship. Delegation to private companies hides
censorship, digital repression, and opinion guidance from public view. Delegation
also allows social media companies to serve as a mediator between state and society
that prevents direct state-netizen conflict. Private companies such as Sina Weibo
advocate for user demand when possible, often deliberating and negotiating over
censorship directives with leadership. This is because providing users with content
they crave and preventing an overly-censored environment is good for their bottom-
line. Because most citizens are not involved in these conflicts, and do not observe
much of the state’s censorship, the internet feels relatively free and unconstrained to
most netizens. This benefits the CCP in three ways:
First, hidden censorship allows the state to engage in “public opinion supervision,”
the process of mining social media data to identify and respond to popular grievances,
without too much fear of preference falsification.7 Alerting users to the censorship and
information controls that happen routinely on their platform could poison the well
from which the regime draws insights about public opinion. In this way, delegation of
information control to private companies can mitigate information problems inherent
in authoritarian rule (Wintrobe et al., 1998; Wallace, 2014; Dickson, 2016). Second,
hiding information control from users not only benefits social media companies by
reducing the cost of censorship implementation and improving user experience on
their platforms, but it also benefits the state by reducing the likelihood of direct state-
netizen conflict. If a netizen who is a regime supporter or who has neutral beliefs about
politics finds out she has been censored, she might reassess her support for the regime.
If a regime-opponent finds out she has been censored, she may escalate her anti-regime
behavior, or attempt to circumvent censorship. Third, outsourcing censorship to
private companies gives the government a scapegoat when censorship decisions result
in popular backlash. If the public displays moral outrage at a censorship decision,
7The theory of preference falsification suggests that individuals will publicly state preferences
they find suboptimal, because their optimal preference is less socially acceptable (Kuran, 1987).
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the state can order a change in policy and claim that the social media company
misinterpreted directives.
1.3 A Brief History of Information Control In China
1.3.1 Pre-Internet Information Controls
In the Chinese political system, the media is often described as the “mouthpiece
of the Party and the bosom-friend of the people.”8 Borrowing from Marxist-Leninist
theory on media, the CCP has considered control of mass media a pillar of its rule.
Throughout its history, however, the methods of Party control over mass media,
the structure of mass media, and the technologies of information dissemination have
changed.
During the Chinese Civil War, the CCP exercised strict control over information
within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) predominantly by means of violence.
This was reflected in Mao Zedong’s concept of the “mass line,” which described a
process whereby leaders were responsible for gathering the chaotic ideas from the
masses, systematizing them, and retransmitting this corrected version through pro-
paganda and “thought reform.” The “correct” way of thinking was policed by leaders
through physical violence and fear-fueled indoctrination. At communist bases such
as Yan’an, uttering a wrong word might result in public criticisms or in some cases
displays of physical violence. Party members were encouraged to confess their impure
thoughts and actions in mandatory “self-criticisms”–written admissions of errors in
their thoughts or behaviors. At the same time, they were expected to police each
other’s thoughts and inform on others. This climate of fear intensified during the
“Rectification Campaign” which was in party carried out in response to articles in the
8This phrase is often used by state media during anniversaries or when proclaiming their allegiance
to the party. One might also hear this phrase uttered in mandatory Marxism classes at Chinese
universities. Chinese: 媒体是党的喉舌，人民的知音
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official paper of the PLA that were critical of a “system of hierarchy and privilege” in
the Yan’an base (Chang and Halliday , 2005, 266-269). This climate of fear regimented
the minds of the early Communists and ensured that leaders alone—especially Mao—
were empowered to communicate with the masses through major Party newspapers,
the Liberation Daily and the People’s Daily. These writings served the purpose of
mobilizing the masses and lower level cadres through published speeches and writings
of leadership.9
Within a few years after Mao Zedong proclaimed the People’s Republic of China,
all media organizations were either shuttered or subsumed by the CCP, resulting
in a Party monopoly over media. Until media marketization reforms, traditional
media were almost entirely state-owned. Editors and staff of media organizations
were also party officials. With no competition and no alternatives to state media,
there was very little pressure to respond to audience demands. This meant that
the Party could exercise control over media organizations through Party membership
and the nomenklatura system (political appointments, promotions and demotions).
To further pressure editors and journalists, the regime at times used the threat of
violence to enforce compliance and promote self-censorship.
Beginning in 1992 and accelerating under Hu Jintao, media in China began to
commercialize. This change was a response to both general trends of increased per-
sonal choice and freedom in Chinese society, and a realization on the part of leadership
that continued state subsidies to media organizations were unsustainable. After me-
dia reforms, the number of publishers in China increased, and for the first time, some
of them were outside of the Party’s direct administrative control. Because some pub-
lishers were commercialized or semi-commercialized, the state could no longer rely
on political appointments to control publishers, and were confronted with a prob-
lem: what is politically sensitive is often a big seller at the newsstand. To control
9These speeches served the purpose of mobilizing the masses in support of Mao’s Rectification
Campaign. For more on information controls in Yan’an, see Volland (2003)
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commercialized media, the CCP began to issue publishing licenses, which could—in
extreme circumstances—be revoked if publishers failed to report within the acceptable
bounds.10
Though the Party loosened its control over media, the number of publishers re-
mained tractable and could be controlled through publishing licenses and legal/violent
threats. The number of licenses could be selectively restricted by the Party and could
include stipulations on what kinds of reporting were allowed. Furthermore, although
the Party could not directly fire editors or journalists, they could weaponize the le-
gal system against editors and journalists who cross the line. For example, in 2004,
Nanfang Media Group published reports of the abuse and death of migrant college
student Sun Zhigang at the hands of state security. This story resulted in public
displays of moral outrage online and in the streets. Guangzhou provincial and munic-
ipal authorities retaliated against the commercial media conglomerate by launching
an investigation into their finances, arresting 3 top executives, and sentencing the
editor-in-chief to 12 years in prison. These highly visible displays of state repression
become seared into the minds of reporters and editors, warning those in commercial
media of the consequences of crossing the line.11 Though occasionally commercial
papers do push the bounds of acceptable reporting, Daniela Stockmann has found
that overall, the reporting in commercial and state-owned media is synchronized,
an indication that the pre-reform control structures have more or less adapted to
commercialization of media in China (Stockmann, 2013).
10“Edge-ball” strategies are common in the Chinese media industry and are used to increase
readership. Edge-ball comes from ping-pong, where shots that target the edge are most likely to
be winners, but also a much more risky move for the offensive player (Keane, 2001). The further a
corporate agent is from a government actor’s locus of power, the more they tend to behave in ways
that are on the edge of what a government actor deems appropriate (Stockmann, 2013).
11Stern and Hassid (2012) call these displays of state repression “control parables.” These control
parables lead media practitioners to self-censor out of fear that extreme consequences might follow
from pushing boundaries or failing to cooperate.
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1.3.2 Post-Internet Information Controls
Control over media became much more intractable with the rise of the internet as
a major source of information. In its efforts to control traditional media, the Party
had relied heavily on pre-publication audits of information through communication
between editorial staff and propaganda departments (Brady , 2009). The ability to
control publishers became difficult in the new information regime brought about by
the internet (Esarey and Xiao, 2011). Whereas before information was transmitted
from publisher to consumer in a one-to-many relationship, the internet blurred the
lines between publisher and consumer facilitating many-to-many information shar-
ing relationships. The state could no longer exercise the same level of control over
publishers because suddenly, everyone with an internet connection could become a
publisher. Instead, the Party shifted its focus toward post-hoc censorship and dele-
gating censorship of content to online platforms.
The process of delegation of censorship to ICPs in China began with two guidelines
issued by the State Council.12 The regulations stipulate that “business websites”
are liable for the content on their own sites, and are required to police and remove
illegal content. It also specifies penalties for noncompliance, stating that, “If the
case is serious, it shall order the perpetrator to suspend operations and undergo
rectification or to temporarily shut down its website.”13 This regulation mirrors the
system that was already in place for traditional media, where editors were liable
for the legality of content they published. Because of the structure of the internet,
however, propaganda departments and other existing bureaucracies could not rely on
pre-publication censorship as it had in its control of traditional media.
The early years of the internet in China involved the state’s shaping of the ICP
12“The Means of Managing Internet Information Services” (互 联 网 信 息 服 务 管 理
办法), archived here http://www.webcitation.org/72GlTQoOO and “The People’s Repub-
lic of China Telecommunication Regulation” (中华人民共和国电信条例) archived here:
http://www.webcitation.org/72GlUunpl
13 Official English translation archived here: http://www.webcitation.org/72GlWKsm7
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market through these regulations. From 2000 to 2009, the internet in China was
social, but fragmented into smaller platforms such as blog service providers (BSPs)
and bulletin board systems (BBS). Each platform hosted only a handful of bloggers
with large followings. Online platforms that shared “harmful content” were warned
by authorities and put on notice by the “China Internet Illegal Information Reporting
Center,” their internet licenses presumably in jeopardy. With pressure to clean up
their platforms, many built or purchased software platforms to censor their own con-
tent. Those who failed to do so were shut down. The popular BSP ‘Bullog’ famously
met this fate in 2009 for hosting “harmful comments on current affairs.”14
This all changed when “micro-blogs,” and more specifically, Sina Weibo, gained
sudden and massive popularity in late 2009. Sina Weibo united netizens once siloed
in small BBS or BSP platforms in a large network that enabled a “loose-ties” type of
content sharing.15 While producing content for mass consumption on BSPs required
writing skills and a large following, Sina Weibo facilitated a low-cost way for ordinary
people to interact with each other, dramatically increasing the number of content
producers on the Chinese internet (Cairns , 2016b). With massive popularity, and a
competitive share of the social media market, the government risked a public backlash
and loss of domestic market share if they shut Sina Weibo down or controlled the
platform too strictly (Pan, 2016).
Traditional media regulations and institutions failed to adapt quickly to this
wholly new mode of information propagation introduced by Sina Weibo and other
microblogs. While smaller platforms could be pressured to self-censor and could be
shut down under “serious” circumstances, social networking sites like Sina could not
reasonably be expected to perfectly police all content produced by its hundreds of
14News report on the shutdown archived here: http://www.webcitation.org/72GlzujAz
15Loose-ties networks involve the sharing of content through loose social connections, i.e. people
you may not personally know such as a journalist, celebrity, or politician. Loose-ties networks can
usually also accommodate close social connections such as family, friends, or coworkers. For an
overview of these different types of social networks in China, see (Stockmann and Luo, 2017).
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millions of registered users. Even today’s most cutting-edge automated natural lan-
guage technologies for identifying objectionable content have serious limitations. At
the time of Sina’s rise, there were no market-ready tools to aid Sina in its censor-
ship responsibilities. Every individual internet user suddenly became a publisher, but
did not have to run what they published by the CCP censors before pressing send.
Without pre-publication control over “harmful content,” these new social media sites
quickly became a space outside of the traditional system of information controls where
citizens could push the bounds of allowed public expression.
The Chinese government faced a dilemma. The internet promised to bring growth
and productivity to China, but the internet’s architecture and these new platforms
made it nearly impossible to use traditional information control tactics. Adapting ex-
isting bureaucratic structures to such a fundamental change would have been difficult
and costly. New modes of control were necessary, but the bureaucratic structures
needed to control the negative externalities of this new “information regime” had
never existed before.
Instead of building these structures from the ground up, the problem was ad-
dressed experimentally16 with the central government directing the process17 through
broad mandates such as “prevent public opinion emergencies” and “guide public
opinion.” Bureaucracies and governments responded improvisationally to accomplish
these broad tasks. Eventually, these specialized modes of information control were
16In the Chinese system, experimental policymaking involves decentralization and autonomy in
early stages of policy development, and then as policies are tried and tested locally, they are adopted
by the central government and rolled out nationally in a process called moving “from point to surface”
(由点到面) (Heilmann, 2008)
17The process of experimentation that characterized the development of internet regulations re-
sembles a process Yuen Yuen Ang calls “directed improvisation.” Directed improvisation is an
experimental and decentralized approach to policy making in the absence of any guiding precedent
or strong institutions necessary to achieve relevant policy goals. In the realm of foreign direct invest-
ment and early economic reforms, (Ang , 2016) identifies an campaign-driven, evolutionary process
of institution building, which she refers to as “beehive campaigns” of development. In early stages of
development, each agency (bees) were enlisted to “prospect for investors for their home states” (gath-
ering honey) while simultaneously performing “formal functions (e.g., environmental protection, law
enforcement, personnel management). Similar campaigns exist in China’s system of information
control, particularly with regard to identifying and responding to public opinion emergencies.
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adopted by the State Council and communicated as national templates (PRC State
Council General Office, 2016).
1.4 How Corporate-Delegated Censorship Works
Today, censorship is delegated to corporations through directives that vary in their
levels of specificity: from vague and broad to precise and targeted. According to a se-
ries of interviews conducted by Christopher Cairns, a wide range of regulatory bureau-
cracies, government organs, and individual leaders at all levels of government partici-
pate in this process. A former employee in the censorship division of Sina Weibo—and
the source of the leaked censorship data used in this dissertation—describes the pro-
cess in detail. A “government relations specialist” communicates with these myriad
government actors receiving “clear, direct and urgent” orders about “whose accounts
need to be removed and which posts need to be deleted.” This individual also “fre-
quently goes to government meetings” to understand “broad censorship guidelines,”
which result in “vague” censorship orders (Wang , 2016b,a).
Cairns (2016a) found that the responsibility of censorship is fragmented across
many bureaucracies, making “life more complicated for Internet companies in deciding
whose orders to follow.” As one company insider claimed, the system was “a mess.”
The leaked censorship documents used in this dissertation confirm what he found,
through interviews with insiders, to be the basic bureaucratic structures that monitor
and direct censorship at Sina Weibo.
Today, social media companies in China are managed at the local level. This
means that, for the most part, delegation, monitoring and sanctioning of private
companies are carried out locally. Because Sina Corp. is headquartered in Bei-
jing, regulatory authority over Sina Weibo is mainly concentrated in two Beijing
provincial-level bureaucracies. They are referred to as the Beijing Municipal Internet
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Propaganda Management Office (Internet Management Office)18, and the Public In-
formation and Internet Safety Supervision Department of the Beijing Public Security
Bureau (Supervision Department).19 Alongside these two main bureaucracies Sina
takes direct orders from the State Council Information Office,20 which is a national-
level bureaucracy that directly reports to the State Council, China’s top government
agency. Several other bureaucracies make direct requests to Sina Weibo, including
provincial propaganda bureaucracies such as the Shanghai News Information Office,
local internet police at all levels of government, provincial governments such as the
Tibet Autonomous Region, and area-specific bureaucracies such as The State Ad-
ministration for Industry and Commerce. Aside from bureaucracies, directives also
come indirectly by way of six Sina Corp. managers who appear to respond directly to
lobbying from unnamed individuals. Note that the data in this dissertation predates
the rise of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) as the chief regulator of
China. In Chapter 3, I discuss some changes to how the system works after the CAC’s
rise to prominence.
As I will stress in later chapters, though many bureaucracies have the power
to send directives to Sina Weibo, Sina Weibo is ultimately responsible for pressing
“delete.” In many cases, for a variety of reasons, Sina does not do so.
1.5 Data
The empirical work in this dissertation draws upon two sources of data. The first
is a dataset of leaked company censorship logs from Sina Weibo which I manually
compiled and coded with several research assistants. The second is a combination
18In Chinese: 北京市互联网宣传管理办公室, abbreviated as 网管办 in the logs.
19In Chinese: 北京市公安局公共信息网络安全监察处, abbreviated as 网监 in the logs.
20The SCIO was elevated in 2011 to directly report to the State Council and was renamed the
SIIO. The logs still use the name SCIO, so to avoid confusion I will use SCIO, even if technically
the organ was called SIIO at the time. In Chinese: 国务院新闻办公室, abbreviated as国新办 in the
logs.
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of two datasets that measure the outcome of censorship on the Sina Weibo platform
during the period of time the leaked censorship logs were made. This allows us
to examine the deliberation and contestation between government and Sina Weibo
leading up to censorship decisions as well as a measure of the end-result of these
deliberations (the censorship outcomes).
1.5.1 Leaked Censorship Logs
In early 2016, the Committee to Protect Journalists reported on a leaked cache
of documents from Sina Weibo’s censorship office.21 These documents log govern-
ment directives, company policies related to content moderation, and management
decisions about how to proceed with censorship of content. The logs record this
information so that it can be shared with employees working in different shifts, min-
imizing duplicated management effort. This dataset is the first of its kind to provide
a look into how censorship delegation works in practice, describe contention between
governments and private social media companies in China, and show both what is
censored and what the government intent behind censorship was. What emerges
from the logs is not a picture of tight control over information, but one in which a
fragmented and decentralized government struggles to compel companies to enforce
broad informational goals.
These data, in their raw form, consist of 588 Microsoft Word documents, each
containing dozens of individual logs. Logs are notes related to government directives,
management censorship decisions, work guidelines, employee duties, etc. In total
there are 8,427 unique logs. Most logs include a mention of a certain type of con-
tent and instructions on how to proceed with censorship, disseminating management
decisions about censorship to employees.
21I am not in direct contact with the source, but the source has been vetted by journalists at CPJ
and I have communicated with the source through contacts at CPJ. The source has consented to
the publication and use of these data for researchers.
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There are 3 main varieties of internet censorship in China. The first, domain-level
filtering, blocks access to certain websites such as Facebook or Twitter. The second,
keyword-based filtering, automatically blocks, or automatically triggers surveillance
or review of content if it contains one, or a combination of blocked words. Third,
manual review, often triggered by keywords, is the process of sending posts to humans
employed by an internet platform to make manual decisions about whether or how
a post should be censored. While many datasets related to censorship capture only
keyword-based censorship22 or manual content review,23 log data include logs about
both. This dataset includes logs from 2011 to 2014, overlapping with other studies of
censorship in China (King et al., 2013, 2014).
There are limitations to the external validity of inferences drawn from these data,
as these logs are from a single social media company, Sina Weibo. That being said,
certain logs suggest that these inferences can generalize to other social media compa-
nies, particularly Tencent. Several logs indicate that competitor Tencent receives the
same directives from the same Beijing provincial-level bureaucracies as well as the
State Council Information Office, and more recently the Cyberspace Administration
of China (CAC). Tencent, like Sina, also delays implementation or disobeys directives
when doing so gives them a competitive edge. Additionally, the market capitalization
of both Sina and competitor Tencent were similar at the time these logs were written,
which means both had similar leverage when it came to negotiating government di-
rectives. It is reasonable, based on the data from the logs to expect that the process
of reporting of users to the authorities is similar at Tencent. Together, Sina and Ten-
cent represent the vast majority of the social media market. The logs also indicate
that tech companies in China cooperate or are influenced by each other’s censorship
22Keyword-based censorship is usually a website’s first line of defense. Keywords are used to
automatically block certain searches that include sensitive terms, automatically trigger surveillance
if a user uses certain terms, or automatically stage content for human review. Oftentimes these lists
will leak and are then analyzed by researchers. See (Crete-Nishihata et al., 2017; Ruan et al., 2016;
Ng , 2016; Knockel et al., 2017, 2011, 2015)
23Manual content review is explored in an experimental setting in King et al. (2014).
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decisions. For example, Sina Weibo cooperates with Baidu when developing keywords
for blocking and content filtering.24
Even a conservative approach to inferences drawn from these logs does not dimin-
ish their significance. Sina Weibo is a very large and popular social media company
in China. During the time of the logs it was the most popular microblog and was
ranked in the top 3 of all domestic social media companies by monthly active user
statistics. During the time of the analysis, Sina Weibo boasted over half a billion
registered users.
This unique dataset, which captures the population of logs from 2011-2014, allows
for direct measurement of the intention and goals governments and private internet
companies. In particular, these capture the decisions of Sina, parent company to
the Sina Weibo platform, and Tencent, a Sina’s chief competitor. Logs include 1)
data on the source of a censorship request, and 2) Sina’s (and sometimes competitor
Tencent’s) response to this request. This allows us to disentangle the intentions of
government principals and corporate agents.
The data contained in these logs confirm earlier work on the fragmentation in-
herent in the Chinese political system (Oksenberg and Lieberthal , 1988) and more
specifically the Chinese media and propaganda system (Cairns , 2017; Stockmann,
2013; Ang , 2014). Logs explicitly name several government principals at different
ranks and bureaucratic functions. They also reveal that multiple corporate agents
compete with each other, inform on each other, and calibrate compliance based on
observed compliance of competitors.
24In a log from May 7, 2013, Sina instructs employees to add to a shared database of blocked
keywords with Baidu in accordance with an arrangement with the company. The log reads: “In the
future, if you add level A, B, or C blocked search keywords, please also add these keywords to the
Baidu cooperation data control system. The specific correspondence is, level A blocked keywords
correspond to Baidu’s level A, and B and C level blocked keywords correspond to Baidu’s level B.”
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1.5.2 Measures of Censorship (Free Weibo and Weiboscope)
As I measure of censorship outcomes, I process data from GreatFire.org and Wei-
boscope, two projects that measure censorship on the Sina Weibo platform. The
GreatFire.org dataset includes 47 million weibo posts spanning from 2009-2018 and
the Weiboscope dataset includes 226 million posts from only 2012. Using these data
I can compare the instructions in the logs to actual censorship outcomes at the event
level. Both datasets are constructed by recording a post soon after it has been created
and later querying for that post at fixed intervals to see if the post has been censored
or deleted.
1.6 Roadmap
In this dissertation, I draw upon these data to answer several key questions about
information controls in China.
In Chapter 2, I test the hypothesis that outsourcing censorship to private compa-
nies results in more “covert” censorship that is designed to hide censorship from the
end-user. I argue that covert censorship improves user experience and reduces costs
of censorship implementation by preventing users from escalating their behavior or
circumventing censorship efforts. Covert censorship improves the state’s ability to
guide opinion and demobilize opponents because it reduces the occurrence of pub-
lic conflicts between state and society while accomplishing the goal of limiting the
scope and spread of counterhegemonic discourse. Because media platforms wish to
minimize the amount of work necessary to carry out censorship directives, they avoid
what Roberts (2018) calls “backlash,” angry or defiant behavior resulting from mak-
ing netizens aware that their posts have been censored.25 When users know what is
being censored, they often attempt to circumvent censorship by using homophones,26
25Roberts (2018) found that when users find out they have been censored, they often continue
posting about the off-limits topic, escalate their behavior, or attempt to circumvent censorship.
26Homophones are words in Chinese that sound nearly identical but use different characters. For
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homoglyphs,27 or by reposting from secondary accounts. To add empirical support
to this theory, I manually label a large database of leaked censorship logs from Sina
Weibo by censorship type (covert vs. overt). I find that the vast majority of cen-
sorship on the Sina Weibo platform is covert (nearly 80%), and that it is favored
because it reduces the workload of content moderators, and thus reduces costs to
private media companies. I also find that covert censorship is used more frequently
on more influential users, an indication that social media companies are concerned
with popular backlash. Qualitative evidence from the log corpus suggests that covert
censorship is a successful method of demobilizing regime opponents.
In Chapter 3, I address the puzzle of imperfect censorship: how China can simul-
taneously boast the most extensive and advanced system of censorship in the world,
while its internet platforms are riddled with criticism, contention, and heated polit-
ical discussions. Popular consensus in the political science literature suggests that
authoritarian governments have a minimalist censorship strategy, and strategically
“allow” specific categories of content online. In this chapter, I argue that imperfect
censorship is mostly a result of principal-agent problems between delegating govern-
ment principals and profit-driven corporate agents such as social media companies.
While social media companies can be punished for failing to comply with government
directives, they can also profit from sensational, anti-government content. Social
media companies push back on censorship directives to satisfy market demand, im-
plementing a maximalist censorship strategy that is constrained by the market. I find
evidence to support this theory from a corpus of leaked censorship logs from China’s
example, when a pro-reform document “Charter 08” or 零八宪章 (pronounced l´ıng ba¯ xia`n zha¯ng)
was blocked, netizens began to use the phrase “County Magistrate 08” or 零八县长 (pronounced
l´ıng ba¯ xia`n zhaˇng) in its place.
27Homoglyphs are characters that look like one another such as “已” and “己” or “因” and “困” or
“日” and “曰.” To circumvent keyword censorship, netizens often replace the blocked character with
another character that looks similar. For example, during anti-Japanese protests, if the phrase “反
日游行” or “Anti-Japanese Demonstration” is blocked, users might write “反曰游行” or “Against
Saying ‘Demonstration”’ instead. Note in the second phrase, the second character “曰” has a middle
horizontal stroke that is not connected to the right vertical stroke, in contrast to the character “日”
in the first phrase.
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second most popular social network, Sina Weibo. In censorship logs—internal records
of government directives and company implementation instructions—I find that 16%
of all directives are deliberately disobeyed. Many logs in these data include Sina’s
explanations for disobedience, and their motivations are clear—they want to gain an
edge over competitors by providing more compelling information in spite of it’s level
of sensitivity to the government. Even when Sina Weibo chooses to implement gov-
ernment directives, I find that market-forces drive the company to resist censorship.
By retreiving exact posts targeted for censorship from hundreds of millions of his-
toric Sina Weibo posts, I calculate the rate of Sina’s implementation of instructions
to employees. I find that the rate of censorship implementation at Sina Weibo dra-
matically increases when content directly affects Sina Weibo’s share price, suggesting
that though Sina has relatively high capacity to censor, they deliberately shirk when
implementing government directives, likely in an attempt to satisfy user demand for
information.
In Chapter 4, I test a prominent theory of minimalist censorship: the “collective
action potential’ hypothesis of (King et al., 2013). The collective action potential
hypothesis posits that the Chinese government intends to censor collective action
but not government criticism. Because the log corpus directly captures intentions of
government actors, I manually labeled all 8,427 logs by topic category. The result-
ing distribution of topics suggests that the government has a maximalist censorship
agenda. While criticism, discussions of government leadership, and crime are tar-
geted much more frequently than collective action content, it appears that the scope
of China’s censorship targets is much broader than we thought. In a separate working
paper with Mary Gallagher, we offer support for an alternative hypothesis, that so-
cial media governance involves precise targeting of individuals, not content. The state
targets users to repress or co-opt based on their influence and clout—or in network
parlance, centrality of their node in counterhegemonic subnetworks—regardless of the
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content they are posting.
In Chapter 5, I outline a method for automatically detecting a type of covert
information control called astroturfing. Using various machine learning and infor-
mation retrieval methods, I find that nearly 15% of all comments in Chinese news
media’s comment sections are created by “astroturfers,” individuals being paid by
the state to produce pro-government content while appearing to be ordinary citizens.
I find that astroturfers in China work at a wide range of bureaucracies and are part
of larger public opinion management teams tasked with “public opinion supervision,”
“guiding public opinion,” and “preventing public opinion emergencies.” This method
of detecting astroturfing will be used in future work to measure the effects of this
information control tactic and analyze the content and strategy behind astroturfer
messages.
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CHAPTER II
Covert Censorship
2.1 Introduction
Sharing something on social media that no one interacts with can be an anxiety-
inducing experience, prompting reflection on whether the content was as insightful or
amusing as initially thought. Receiving no likes or retweets, however, doesn’t neces-
sarily indicate that content is unpopular. It could also mean it was censored. Using a
new dataset of internal censorship documents from a popular social networking site,
I show that a majority of Sina Weibo users in China who experience censorship will
not know they have been censored. They will instead observe their posts languishing
on their timelines without likes, upvotes, or comments.
In this chapter, I will begin by introducing the concept of “covert censorship”:
censorship that is not visible to the person being censored. I will then outline how the
profit incentives of private social media companies lead them to prefer covert rather
than overt censorship tactics. I then examine the impact of covert censorship on
users using a leaked database of censorship logs from Sina Weibo that record whether
a post was overtly or covertly censored. I find that Sina Weibo instructs content
moderators to use covert censorship tactics in the vast majority of logs (79.27%). I
hypothesize that the purpose of these covert censorship tactics is to prevent the user
from finding out that they have been censored for three reasons: to diminish users
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capacity to circumvent censorship, to prevent backlash that comes from censorship,
and to help platforms appear relatively free and open. Analysis of log data support
this hypothesis, but further data from survey experiments is needed to understand
how covert censorship tactics affect user behavior.
2.2 Background
In this section I introduce how censorship works in China and at Sina Weibo in
particular. I begin by situating the censorship observed at Sina Weibo within the
many high-level methods of censorship used to limit free expression in China. I then
explain how the process of censorship works at social media companies and introduce
the main methods of censorship used by content moderators at Sina Weibo.
2.2.1 Types of Censorship
Censorship in China comes in many distinct forms. At a high level, there two dis-
tinct varieties of censorship: micro-censorship and macro-censorship. Macro-censorship
uses software- and hardware-based interventions that prevent whole domains from be-
ing accessed.1 Macro-censorship is often referred to as “The Great Firewall of China,”
and is what makes foreign websites like Facebook, Twitter, and the New York Times
inaccessible. By contrast, micro-censorship targets individual expression within the
subset of websites one can readily access in China. Micro-censorship happens at the
post, comment, or article level and is carried out by social media companies or other
internet content producers (ICPs).
Micro-censorship is accomplished in several ways: keyword filtering, manual con-
tent review, and algorithmic filtering. There are a wide range of micro-censorship
methods, due to the practice of delegated censorship that takes place in domesti-
1The Chinese government detects and censors content using deep-packet inspection (DPI) (Wag-
ner , 2008, 2009). They also make use of DNS poisoning to prevent routing of traffic to the right IP
address.
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cally licensed internet companies in China. As such, each platform develops its own
methods of combating “harmful” content targeted by government directives. Key-
word filtering is the first line of defense of many ICPs. Keywords, either single words,
phrases, or co-occurring words or phrases, prevent searches, posts, or comments about
the most categorically off-limits content (i.e. links to pornography websites, mentions
of the banned cult Falun Gong, mentions of the Tiananmen Square Protests, or mock-
ing nicknames of leaders). Keyword lists, however, do not always result in automatic
blocking or search restrictions. Instead, there are usually different levels of keyword
lists. At Sina Weibo, there are 3 levels of keywords based on some combination of
political sensitivity and the likelihood that a non-sensitive post will be flagged by a
user who includes that keyword (false positive rate). The list with the most sensi-
tive/lowest false-positive rate keywords will be used to automatically censor content
that includes these keywords. The other two lists trigger the second kind of censor-
ship: manual content review. This process is visualized in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: How Sina Censors Content
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Manual content review is a process where social media companies send content
to content moderators who then manually decide whether or how the content should
be censored. Decisions about censorship are sometimes saved in a “sample database”
(样本库) to detect similar content in the future. This is useful when users try to
evade censorship by using homophones, homoglyphs or other censorship circumven-
tion methods because blocking based on the “sample database” is informed by similar-
ity measures rather than simple keyword matches. This is called algorithmic review,
which according to the source of the leak was under development toward the end of
the log data and did not work very well.2
2.2.2 Types of Censorship at Sina Weibo
At Sina Weibo, employees in charge of content moderation make most of the
decisions about what is and is not censored on their platform. Posts are flagged and
sent to these content moderators through keywords, management-directed “audits”
(审核) of certain posts or accounts, or user reports. Though these content moderators
do outright delete content, they have a variety of other methods of “handling” (处理)
content. Employees working at Sina Weibo commonly choose to “handle” content in
one of 5 ways: “delete,” “secret,” “friend restrict,” and “conceal.” All of these ways
of handling content involve hiding content from a subset of users on the Sina Weibo
platform; they are visualized in Figure 2.2 and are described in Table 2.1.
2The source said, in an interview with CPJ: “The department had plans to computerize censor-
ship, designing programs to enable computers to complete complex censorship tasks. But the plans
didn’t pan out, mainly because they were too expensive. The cost of manual labor in comparison
was lower. Sina’s image recognition technology, to make computers identify the content of pictures,
in my opinion was pretty bad, but it was being developed.”
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Figure 2.2: Types of Censorship
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Though the five censorship choices mentioned above are the most commonly used
in the data, they are not an exhaustive set of the ways in which Sina handles ob-
jectionable content. Oftentimes, rather than getting rid of content, Sina Weibo will
choose to slow the spread of that information, increasing what Roberts (2018) calls
“information friction.” The main way in which Sina Weibo does this is by “stopping
functionality.” This usually entails disabling sharing features such as private messages
or retweets/reshares. Sina also at times cooperates with the authorities by sharing
information on public opinion or informing on its users’ bad behavior. Certain users
and posts can be “reported up,” or escalated to a “government affairs liaison” and
potentially forwarded to the authorities (Gallagher and Miller , 2018). Sometimes
users will have posts deleted and will be warned in a private message that their post
contained objectionable content. Users can also be banned for any fixed period, or
have their account deleted. Oftentimes users will create new accounts after they are
banned and continue posting objectionable content. These users are referred to by
Sina as the “reincarnation party” (转世党). These individuals, when identified, are
sometimes IP blocked.
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2.3 Covert Censorship
I define covert censorship as measures to limit the visibility of content in a way that
is intended to be unobserved by a particular individual or group (usually an author or
searcher). One common type of covert censorship measure is called “shadow banning,”
a type of censorship that makes content invisible to all but the original poster. Shadow
banning is used in many social media companies inside and outside of China.3
Covert censorship has become more and more common in China in the past several
years. On China’s most popular social media platform, WeChat, shadow-banning is
the default method of censoring content in group chats and one-on-one messages.
The Citizen Lab at University of Toronto has also found that shadow-banning affects
Chinese users and foreign users differently.4 In late 2016, Baidu, China’s equivalent
of Google, stopped notifying users that their search results “may relate to content
that does not comply with relevant laws, regulations, and policies, and have not been
displayed.”5 Sina Weibo stopped including a similar notice in its search results in
2014.6
For content posted on a user’s timeline at Sina Weibo, there are three varieties
of covert censorship: secret, friend restrict, and conceal. “Secret” is equivalent to
shadow-banning as it is commonly understood; it hides content from all users but the
original poster. “Conceal” and “friend restrict” restrict the visibility of content to
different levels of social connections but keep content visible to the original poster.
“Conceal” limits visibility to the original poster and their friends and followers, “friend
3Twitter, for example, uses shadowbanning to combat harassment and “bad-faith actors” though
they insist that, by their own definition, they do not shadow ban. Shadow banning is de-
fined by Twitter as “deliberately making someone’s content undiscoverable to everyone except
the person who posted it, unbeknownst to the original poster.” Conveniently, because of one
word—undiscoverable—Twitter can claim to not shadow ban according to this definition. Instead,
Twitter penalizes “bad-faith actors” by ranking them lower so that they appear at the bottom of a
follower’s list of tweets, unbeknownst to the bad-faith actor.
4See report here: http://www.webcitation.org/71xsYmDvk
5A blog documented the change here: http://www.webcitation.org/71wjOx1Aj. Additionally,
the change is documented on question site Zhihu here: http://www.webcitation.org/71wjTfffo
6See report here: http://www.webcitation.org/71xoUQW0Q
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restrict” limits visibility to the original poster’s “friend circle” (好友圈). Because
most follower/following relationships are weak (the user does not know followers/fans
personally, i.e. celebrities, writers, journalists, etc.), Sina Weibo allows users to create
a “friend circle” that includes individuals with whom they share strong ties such as
friends and family. These three types of covert censorship are visualized in Figure
2.1.
2.4 The Market Logic of Covert Censorship
Why does Sina Weibo covertly censor content? Why not just delete all offending
posts outright? Some theories of censorship suggest that the topic of content targeted
for censorship is important in determining outcomes. Some posit that censorship is
selective for informational reasons, informing the center of local government corrup-
tion and malfeasance (Egorov et al., 2009a; Lorentzen, 2014; Malesky and Schuler ,
2011). Other works claim that the government deliberately targets collective action
content and tolerates government criticism. I hypothesize that content does not influ-
ence whether a post is overtly or covertly censored. Instead, I argue that Sina Weibo
wants to prevent users, especially highly influential users, from discovering they have
been censored. This is due to three main ways that covert censorship prevents alert-
ing users to censorship on their platform and consequently harming their business
interests:
First, covert censorship diminishes users’ capacity to circumvent censorship be-
cause users are not notified of censorship. When users are notified of censorship, they
can learn the decision rules governing what is censored, and can exploit loopholes in
these rules. This makes the process of censorship adversarial, and Sina Weibo must
spend more time and money to moderate content produced by these users. Users can
circumvent censorship by changing a few keywords, deliberately misspelling censored
words, or using clever phrases that seem innocuous, but carry hidden meaning be-
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neath them. This is how users broke the news of Zhou Yongkang, former Politburo
Standing Committee member’s demise. Because his name was blocked, users referred
to him with the name of a popular brand of instant noodles, “Master Kang,” that
shared a character in his name. When he was expelled from the Party and gov-
ernment, netizes wrote, “Master Kang has been cooked.” This put the ICPs in the
awkward position of policing the discussion of instant noodles for a time.7 Censorship
circumvention like this can put Sina at risk of government sanctions for violating di-
rectives. Keeping track of the many clever wordplays to evade censorship is a difficult
task. According to the source of the leak, Sina Weibo struggled with the proliferation
of keywords such as these that attempted to get around censorship:
“During my time at Sina, sensitive words increased from 2,000 to at least over
10,000. Phrases like ”McDonald’s” and ”combo No.3” [code words for orga-
nizing protests] became sensitive words during the Jasmine incident, but they
didn’t get taken off from the ”sensitive words list” until the end of 2012, a result
of both tardiness and playing it safe. The ever-expanding list of sensitive words
greatly increased the workload of the censorship department, which resulted in
the lower quality of censorship.”8
Second, covert censorship can prevent backlash that comes from censorship, as
experiencing censorship can cause individuals to feel angry and escalate their behav-
ior. As Roberts (2015) demonstrates, users who find out they have been censored
respond with anger, criticism of censors, or by continuing to post off-limits content.
Escalation of bad behavior means more work for content moderators which increases
the cost of content moderation. Users who are censored but are highly motivated to
share a certain type of content may join the “reincarnation party,” serially creating
new accounts once the previous one has been blocked.
Third, covert censorship increases the appearance that platforms are relatively free
and open, which is desirable to users. Sina risks losing users if it gains a reputation
7For more information on this event, see a report at ChinaFile here:
http://www.webcitation.org/71xsmVFHX
8See http://www.webcitation.org/727WJLM9x
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for strict censorship, and thus wants to minimize the tangible impact of censorship
on users. Experiencing censorship is unpleasant, and Sina Weibo wants users to feel
good about using their platform. If users are constantly receiving censorship notices,
they may take their business elsewhere. This concern is apparent in the database of
leaked censorship logs analyzed below, and is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
2.5 Empirical Analysis
Using a database of censorship logs from Sina Weibo, I adjudicate between two
hypotheses, 1) that covert censorship is selectively used for certain topics of content,
punishing discussion of certain types of content through overt censorship, while hiding
censorship for content that is less objectionable and 2) that covert censorship’s main
purpose is to hide censorship from users, regardless of content, since alerting users
to censorship can harm a platform’s business interests. To test these hypotheses, I
manually label the censorship instruction for each log in the leaked log database (the
type of censorship Sina Weibo employees are instructed to use for the content in logs),
and the topic of content in the logs (for a detailed explanation on coding procedures,
please see chapter 4).
I examine the relationship between content and censorship outcomes using multi-
nomial logistic regression comparing the outcome variable, “censorship type,” a vari-
able with three unordered levels “do not handle,” “covert censorship,” and “overt
censorship.” I include all top-level topic categories as independent variables. I find
that certain categories of content are “covertly” or “overtly” censored more often than
the baseline category “not handled,” namely collective action, government criticism,
corruption, ethnic minorities, rumors, and sensitive anniversaries. I also find that
the topic “disasters” is more likely to be not handled than handled. This is consis-
tent with a common guideline of openness when reporting on disasters Zou and Su
(2015); PRC State Council General Office (2016). However, there is not a statistical
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difference in the coefficients for the “overt” and “covert” censorship levels at the 95%
confidence, suggesting that topic does not affect decisions to covertly or overtly censor
(see Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.3: Multinomial Logistic Regression Plot of Censorship Type by Topic
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
−0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
Coll. A
ctionCorrup
tion Disaste
r
Ethnic
 Minor
ities
Foreign
 Media
Govern
ment C
riticism
Govern
ment L
eaders
hip
Hong K
ong/Ta
iwan
Nation
alism Rumor
s
Sensiti
ve Ann
iversar
y
Sexual
ity
Terrori
sm
Topic
Co
ef
fic
ie
nt
 V
a
lu
e
Censorship Type l Overt Covert
Based on the censorship instructions in directives, 78.83% of posts are “secreted.”
This means that, at least on the Sina Weibo platform, the most common form of
censorship is likely to be unobserved. A distribution of the types of censorship in the
data can be seen in Table 2.1. In order to identify the purpose of this high level of
covert censorship tactics on the Sina Weibo platform, I examined logs where censor-
ship instructions differed by the level of user influence. I find that when a log specifies
different censorship methods for users based on their influence, the censorship method
suggested for more big/important users is more covert in 80.27% of logs. In Table 2.2,
36.91% of logs with different instructions for “big/important” and “small/ordinary”
users recommend deletion for small/ordinary users and secret for big/important users.
In 27.9%, covert censorship is recommended for small/ordinary users, and the even
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less intrusive “audit” is recommended for big/important users. This is likely due to
the relative ease to which big users can infer they have been covertly censored, as they
have become used to a baseline level of user interaction with their content. Instead
of covertly censoring their content, they simply censor comments on their content
and reposts of their content. The texts of logs themselves are also strong evidence
supporting the notion that covert censorship tactics are meant to prevent users from
finding out they have been censored. In log from 2/18/11, employees were given the
following notice about a specific user:
“Colleagues responsible for audits and user monitoring please be aware: Beijing
Zhu Fuxiang has been temporarily put under surveillance and is being audited.
He is demolition and rights protection advocate. The Supervision Department
says you should not delete his things. If he is too radical, use ‘secret.’ Don’t
provoke him.”9
Logs also frequently mention difficulties arising from the “reincarnation party,”
which suggest that users finding out they have been censored can have long standing
negative impacts on Sina Weibo’s censorship division. The reincarnation party con-
sists of users who continuously create new accounts and continue posting “harmful”
content after being deleted. Once a user has become a member of this party, they
appear to become a continual source of work for Sina Weibo.
2.6 Discussion
How does covert censorship, or more broadly, covert information control such as
comment astroturfing (see Chapter 5) increase the effectiveness of information controls
in China? Covert censorship hides censorship from users and in doing so obscures the
role of the state in the process of censorship. Overt censorship, by contrast, usually
requires an explanation for the disappearance of content, often referencing “relevant
government regulations.” Covert censorship minimizes the anger and backlash that
9Original Chinese: 审核负责人监控的同事请注意，北京朱福祥暂时加为负责人监控。他是拆迁
维权的，网监 要求：千万不要删除他的东西，如果有过激的都私密。不要招惹他。
34
Table 2.1: Descriptions of Censorship Types and Other Content Moderation Terms
Name
(EN)
Name
(ZH)
Type Description Percent
of
Logs
Secret 私密 Censorship
Method
Hide the post from all from all users but
the original poster.
78.83%
Delete 删除 Censorship
Method
Remove the post; the original poster and
all other users cannot see the post.
16.38%
Don’t
Handle
不处理 Censorship
Method
Take no action on the post or a certain
type of post mentioned in the directive.
2.47%
Stop
Function-
ality
禁止 Censorship
Method
Report post/user to Beijing-based “Gov-
ernment Affairs Liaison” for high-level
Sina or Beijing Municipal Government of-
ficials to deal with personally.
1.89%
Conceal 隐藏 Censorship
Method
Hide the post from all users who are not
following the original poster.
0.22%
Friend
Restrict
友处理 Censorship
Method
Hide the post from all users outside of the
original poster’s friend circle (好友圈). A
friend circle is a group of close friends with
whom a user chooses to selectively share
more personal content.
0.22%
Audit 审核 Surveillance Add a post or user to a list for employees
to manually audit and review comments
that are made on that post or user profile.
19.16%
Report
Up
上报 Escalation,
Repression
The post cannot be retweeted or shared in
a private message by anyone.
7.22%
(Roberts , 2018) finds results from censorship which is bad for both private internet
platforms and the state. By preventing backlash, covert censorship also reduces the
occurrence of conflicts between users and the state over the acceptable bounds of
discussion. Users who are ambivalent about political issues are less likely to find
out through censorship that their opinions are in opposition to the state. This may
suppress latent members of the opposition who could be activated by discovery of the
state’s revealed preferences through censorship.
Covert censorship also may impact user behavior, as objectionable posts will re-
ceive no accolades, no likes, and no retweets. It merits further exploration whether
depriving users of this positive feedback can lead to changes in behavior or opinion.
Many have written on the Chinese state’s use of psychological coercion to maintain
control of opponents (Ong , 2015; Chen, 2017; Cai , 2008; Deng and O’Brien, 2013;
O’Brien and Deng , 2015). Perhaps covert censorship can serve similar coercive func-
35
Table 2.2: Logs with Different Instructions for Ordinary and Important Users
Small/Ordinary
User Instruction
Big/Important
User Instruction
Count Percent
Delete Secret 86 36.91
Secret Audit 65 27.9
Delete Audit 16 6.87
Secret Stop 14 6.01
Secret Delete 12 5.15
Secret Pass/Allow 6 2.58
Stop Secret 5 2.15
Other Other 29 12.45
tions without users attributing blame to the state.
Many of these theories of the impact of covert censorship will be explored in survey
experiments that will be fielded in the near future.
2.7 Conclusion
In the data analysis above, I presented evidence that covert censorship is preferred
by social media companies because it hide censorship from users, and reduces costly
backlash and circumvention efforts that result from users finding out they have been
censored. I also outlined many ways in which hiding censorship would be beneficial
to the interests of a private company.
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CHAPTER III
The Limits of Commercialized Censorship in China
Introduction
Why do scathing criticisms, allegations of government corruption, and content
about collective action make it past the censors in China? Past works have theo-
rized that regime strategies or state-society conflicts are the reason for incomplete
censorship. While these factors likely contribute to incomplete censorship, I suggest
that incomplete censorship results in part from delegation of censorship to private
companies which creates a principal-agent problem. Censorship directives are passed
through a tangled network of multiple government principals and are delegated to pri-
vate social media corporations. Government principals and media corporation agents
are driven by competing logics: the government logic of information control and the
market logic of satisfying user demand for information, respectively.
Using a unique corpus of leaked documents from a social media company, Sina
Weibo, I demonstrate that these conflicting logics are the cause of much of censor-
ship’s apparent incompleteness. I find that 16% of directives from the government are
disobeyed by Sina Weibo and that disobedience is driven by Sina’s concerns about
censoring more strictly than competitor Tencent. I also find that the fragmentation
inherent in the Chinese political system exacerbates this principal agent problem.
Fragmentation results in decentralization of censorship enforcement, competition be-
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tween government agencies over censorship objectives, and non-uniform distribution
of regulatory leverage across the many government agencies in charge of delegating
censorship and sanctioning social media companies for non-compliance.
This chapter contributes to our understanding of media control because it shows
that market competition impacts information control outcomes, breaking with a large
body of works on information control that assume market competition doesn’t matter.
This chapter complements the work of Yang (2013) by showing that market concerns
open space for contention in China, but it also emphasizes that market competition
is the main driving force behind this opening. Internet businesses push back on
government controls in an effort to appear “more free” than competitors, leading to
expanded space for contention.
3.1 The Southern Weekend Incident
Each year, the liberal Chinese newspaper Southern Weekend writes a New Years
editorial on a theme they would like to characterize the coming year. In January
of 2013, they chose the theme “China Dream, Constitutional Dream,” stressing the
need for progress in the coming year on strengthening the rule of law and protecting
rights enshrined in the constitution. After the editorial team submitted their final
draft to the Guangzhou Propaganda Department and received no edits, they assumed
everything had been approved for publication. The editors and Southern Weekend’s
readers were surprised when they opened their newspapers and found a fawning paean
to the Party in place of the expected boundary-pushing editorial that had become
the newspaper’s trademark. The article boasted, “we are closer to the Chinese dream
than ever before” among other platitudes.
This clumsy reworking of the editorial resulted in a strike by Southern Weekend
editorial staff and sizable student protests in major Chinese cities. The strike and
protests gained momentum through coordination and discussion on major Chinese so-
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cial networking sites such as Sina Weibo1, despite four strongly worded directives from
the Central Propaganda Department and top leadership to cease all such discussion.
This apparent incapacity to control perhaps the most threatening type of information
online—information with potential to fuel student-led collective action2—may come
as a surprise to many. The Chinese state is often represented in press and academic
writing as a monolith3, with high capacity to control information flows using the many
advanced methods of censorship at its disposal. However, in many circumstances, it
seems that intense pressure from the highest levels of the party and government fails
to move social media companies like Sina Weibo to act.
1According to monthly active user statistics, throughout most of the log data, Sina Weibo was
the second largest social network in China, behind Qzone. WeChat, China’s most popular social
platform is a messaging app that is similar to What’sApp, but with several social, payment, and
service features tacked on. Though WeChat’s monthly active users surpassed Sina Weibo in Q1 of
2012, it is not a competitor with Sina Weibo in the same way as Tencent Weibo is; both have a
similar microblog platform, ostensibly inspired by Twitter. Because Tencent Weibo has been in beta
for several years, Tencent does not report MAU numbers in its annual financial reports, however,
most measures of active users during the period in which the logs were created put Sina Weibo
comfortably in the lead.
2The Chinese Communist Party has experienced many student-led movements that have pre-
sented clear threats to its grip on power. Students initialized and sustained the Great Proletar-
ian Cultural Revolution, a movement resulting in the dismantling of state and party institutions
through arbitrary mass violence. Student—led movements on two separate occasions—in 1976 and
in 1989—sparked mass protests which at the time seemed capable of threatening the CCP’s monopoly
on power.
3Much work on censorship assumes that either the government is a unitary actor or that the
central government is the main enforcer of censorship. Formal literature, often for the sake of
parsimony, defines “the government” or “the autocrat” as the singular actor and practitioner of
censorship (Lorentzen, 2014; Guriev and Treisman, 2015; Gehlbach and Sonin, 2014; Chen and Xu,
2016; Egorov et al., 2009b) (King et al., 2013) draw inferences from censorship outcomes to measure a
singular intention of a single government actor: to allow criticism but censor content with “collective
action potential.”
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3.2 Delegation, Fragmentation, and Agency Loss
During the Southern Weekend editorial incident, the Propaganda Department of
Guangzhou4 and the Central Propaganda Department5 were involved in attempts
to control the spread of information on the event. Despite these urgent attempts
to censor all mention of this incident, a novel leaked dataset from 2011-2014 docu-
ments that popular social media company Sina Weibo willfully ignored directives to
remove content related to the incident on their platform. Sina’s calculus was clear.
By providing more information about the strike and protests, they could attract
information-seeking users away from chief competitor Tencent.6 One log of company
decisions instructs employees to “not be stricter than Tencent,” and to hold off on
implementing government directives until “urged to block content a second time.”
When told to delete users, Sina instructed employees to block users temporarily and
unblock them the following day “as soon as you receive instructions.”7 The case of
the Southern Weekend editorial incident illustrates how government fragmentation
and delegation of censorship to private corporations can result in incomplete censor-
ship outcomes. In this case, the Central Propaganda Department, the Guangzhou
Propaganda Department, and the Beijing Municipal Government agencies directly
4Tuo Zhen, the head of the Guangdong Propaganda Department at the time was concerned
about limiting the fallout in response to the editorial incident, especially since he was being blamed
by both the public and the Central Government. See this archived analysis for more information:
https://web.archive.org/web/20180730135458/http://chinamediaproject.org/2013/01/07/inside-
the-southern-weekly-incident/
5The original directives can be found archived at the following links:
http://www.webcitation.org/71yPYfpyj, http://www.webcitation.org/71yPahJIQ,
and http://www.webcitation.org/71yPeE80B
6Tencent is the largest ICP company in China. It owns WeChat, Tencent Weibo, and QZone,
three of China’s most popular social platforms. It is Sina’s most direct competitor.
7Full text of log from 1/5/2013: “There is a lot of related content on Tencent. After we reported
[their lack of implementation] to the Network Management Office, Tencent implemented [censorship
of the content]. Currently [Sina] Weibo is partially carrying out instructions to block content. First
prevent retweets on content flagged [by the Network Management Office]. When urged to block
content a second time, fully implement directives. With respect to banning users, for the meantime
do not implement [user bans]... handle users relative to Tencent’s [level of] implementation. We
should not be stricter than Tencent. Today maintain user blocks, tomorrow as soon as you receive
instructions release the block.”
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involved in managing Sina Weibo had different objectives and were unable to ade-
quately monitor and sanction the company. By delegating censorship to Sina Weibo,
concerns over user retention and competitiveness became a factor in the company’s
decision to comply with directives. By Sina’s calculations, the cost of flouting govern-
ment directives outweighed the benefits of increased user engagement. In this section
I outline this theory in detail. In subsequent sections, I present evidence in support
of this theory from censorship logs like the one mentioned above and large databases
that measure censorship outcomes on the Sina Weibo platform.
3.2.1 Corporate Delegation Leads to Agency Loss
Private companies play a crucial role in the process of censorship, as they bear
the ultimate responsibility for removing content from their platforms. Despite their
central role, private companies are too often missing from models of information ma-
nipulation. In China, censorship is delegated and regulated through internet content
providers (ICP) licenses. ICP licenses are necessary to operate an internet business
in China. These licenses can be revoked or suspended if ICPs do not comply with
government directives.
Sina Weibo and many ICPs like it have had to balance user and shareholder
demand with regulatory pressures from government agencies since they were first
founded. In 2014, when Sina Weibo became listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange,
it made these concerns explicit. In its regulatory filing with the SEC, it included
“regulation and censorship of information disseminated over the internet in China” as
a major risk that could affect its share price. In the filing, Sina Weibo also noted that
censorship “may adversely affect our user experience and reduce users’ engagement
and activities on our platform as well as adversely affect our ability to attract new
users to our platform.”8 Since Sina’s listing on NASDAQ the company has been
8Full article accessible here: https://web.archive.org/web/20180812134506/
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fined several times by Chinese government agencies for failing to meet censorship
regulations. Sina’s user engagement and activity has declined in recent years, in
part due to the rising popularity of WeChat, a chat-based social networking site
like WhatsApp. Some analysts, however, have attributed this decline to increasing
perceptions of Sina Weibo as a heavily-censored platform.9
I argue that “incomplete” censorship is largely a result of a clash between ICPs
responding to popular demand for information and government actors responding to
pressures to maintain social stability and protect their position within government.
The process of delegating to private internet companies creates a principal-agent
problem. Government principals delegate censorship to private internet companies
through directives: verbal or written instructions providing details about how these
private internet companies are supposed to handle certain kinds of objectionable
content. Private internet companies then decide if and how they will comply. Because
there is often a misalignment of preferences between the government principal and the
ICP agent, private internet companies may ignore the directive or partially implement
it. Because of this disobedience, the delegating principal suffers agency loss: agents
acting against their principals’ interests.
Competition between private internet companies further exacerbates this problem.
In China, each government principal delegates censorship to several private internet
companies, meaning that there are multiple agents involved in China’s system of
censorship. Rundlett and Svolik (2016) have shown that when a principal has multiple
agents, principals suffer agency loss. Private internet companies benefit from having
compelling information on their platforms. However, compelling content may also
be considered “harmful information” to the authorities. Highly motivated users who
are seeking this information often hop from platform to platform when content is
censored (Roberts , 2017). By censoring less, private internet companies can attract
9See: http://www.webcitation.org/72Kwc4BJ7
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these users to their platform and away from their competitors. This competition
over users results in a race to the bottom as each company strategically tries to skirt
directives more than competitors. Companies seek to jointly minimize the cost of
censorship (lost user retention and engagement) and the cost of non-compliance with
government directives.
Private internet companies deliberately shirk, lack capacity to implement direc-
tives, or some combination of the two. Private internet companies can take advantage
of hidden information about their technical capabilities and budgets to invest as little
as possible in developing high-performance censorship systems. They can also shirk,
as their effort censoring content is not easy to measure or observe. Private internet
companies take advantage of hidden actions and hidden information to skirt directives
when they anticipate that the benefits outweigh the costs.
3.2.2 Bureaucratic Fragmentation Leads to Agency Loss
Fragmentation of China’s political system further complicates censorship delega-
tion. While on paper the Chinese political system is rigidly hierarchical, in practice,
contestation between state and party organs, and bureaucracies with overlapping
policy domains is common throughout the system. The findings of this analysis con-
firm earlier suppositions about the fragmentation inherent in the Chinese political
system.10 This fragmented system, which Oksenberg and Lieberthal (1988) coined
“fragmented authoritarianism” is characterized by de facto veto power of local gov-
ernments when implementing central policies and the tangled lines of authority in
China’s vast bureaucracy. I argue that incomplete censorship is in part due to the
fragmentation of China’s political system. This fragmentation leads to agency loss—
disobedience of, or incapacity to implement government directives—due to two major
attributes of China’s system of censorship: common agency and local bias.
10See O’Brien (1994); Montinola et al. (1995); Lieberthal (1995); Jin et al. (2005); Zheng (2007);
Stern and O’Brien (2012); Mertha (2009)
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First, common agency11 of private internet companies gives them discretion about
which agency’s directives to follow. Many bureaucracies in China have the authority
to delegate censorship to private internet companies. This makes monitoring and
sanctioning of private internet companies difficult because each individual bureau-
cracy must rely on their own limited resources in order to monitor compliance after
they have issued their directive. Private internet companies receive directives from
multiple principals (sometimes referred to as “common agency”), so they often have
discretion about which directives to follow, especially with principals do not have
uniform preferences (Calvert et al., 1989), as is often the case in China. Because of
this, it is not uncommon to observe inconsistencies in the way content is censored
across private internet companies due to this discretion.12
Second, the power to enforce directives is locally biased, i.e. power is concentrated
in the locality of an ICP’s headquarters. Local agencies where media companies are
headquartered have more control over what gets censored as they have access to the
most proximate and effective levers of power to enforce compliance with directives.
This leads to agency loss because the central government and local governments out-
side of the ICP’s jurisdiction do not have the same implements of enforcement and
are easier to ignore. Because private internet companies are constantly weighing
the cost of non-enforcement and expected revenue from satisfying user demand, pri-
vate internet companies will pay outsized attention to local directives, despite being
national platforms. Without a centralization of the power to issue and enforce di-
rectives, private internet companies can selectively ignore directives from outside of
11Many government agencies have the power to issue directives to single private internet compa-
nies.
12For example, there is significant correlation among censored keyword lists in Chinese game cha-
trooms when they are created by the same parent company or developer, but very weak correlation
among lists within the same Chinese provincial or city jurisdiction (Knockel et al., 2017). Previous
work has found inconsistencies in the implementation of censorship across platforms and compa-
nies operating in China, including search engines (Villeneuve, 2008), blogging services (MacKinnon,
2009), chat apps (Crandall et al., 2013), live streaming (Crete-Nishihata et al., 2016), and mobile
games (Knockel et al., 2017), which suggests companies have flexibility and discretion when inter-
preting and implementing censorship directives.
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their jurisdiction.
The complexities of information control in China’s fragmented system have been
well-studied as they relate to traditional media. In a study of newspapers, Stockmann
(2013) finds that during the reform of China’s media system, fragmentation posed
a challenge to state monitoring and sanctioning of commercialized newspapers. She
argues that factional affiliations, rank of a media company’s sponsoring agency, and
geographical jurisdiction defined a “discursive space,” giving media companies greater
freedom to report more critically about opposing factions, lower ranked agencies, or
other geographical regions. Mertha (2009) finds that policy entrepreneurs make use of
the media to lobby and appeal to various fragmented interests across China’s bureau-
cracy. Others have noted the many conflicts between central and local governments,
party and state organs, propaganda departments in different localities, and media
organizations and regulators (Brady , 2009; Lynch, 1999; Shambaugh, 2007).
3.3 Data and Methods
To test the above theoretical claims, that fragmentation and corporate delegation
result in outcomes that deviate from the intentions of delegating government princi-
pals, researchers face a number of challenges. Despite the vital role private internet
companies play in China’s system of censorship, there has been a dearth of data on
them and very little scholarship dedicated to them. Much of the available data used
to study Chinese censorship consists of only content and censorship outcomes. These
data do not provide any information about the interactions between individuals in
government and between private internet companies and government actors that de-
termine what is and is not censored. Due to limitations of available data, assumptions
that censorship outcomes can serve as a measure of government intent are common,
despite the central role non-government actors play in the process.
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3.3.1 Log Data
To address these shortcomings, I have created a custom dataset of censorship
logs—notes taken in the process of censorship at Sina Weibo, one of China’s most
popular social networking sites. This dataset is the first of its kind to capture the
entire process of Chinese censorship, from a government directive to a private internet
company, to that private internet company’s decision on how or whether to comply.
With the help of research assistants, I have coded these logs by content, the bureau-
cracy issuing directives to Sina Weibo, and whether or not Sina Weibo implemented
these directives. Log data adds empirical support to the theoretical claims detailed
earlier in the following ways:
First, because these logs measure disobedience, they can provide insights into the
relative power of bureaucracies to delegate censorship. By examining the variance
in Sina’s rates of compliance with directives across different bureaucracies, we can
observe how fragmentation leads to agency loss. If fragmentation results in agency
loss, rates of compliance with directives should be correlated with a bureaucracy’s
power to monitor and sanction Sina Weibo.
Second, logs include direct and indirect information about the reasons behind
non-compliance with directives. Occasionally managers explain their decisions to
comply or disobey government directives. If corporate delegation leads to agency
loss due to concerns about competitors and the adverse impact of censorship on user
experience, Sina Weibo managers should express these concerns in the logs. Other
less direct evidence of profit motivations can be observed in how thoroughly Sina
censors content that is harmful to its business interests and content that is harmful
to government interests. By comparing the censorship rates of Sina-related news
events and censorship on behalf of a government actor, these logs can add support to
claims that Sina Weibo factors market concerns into its censorship efforts. Comparing
censorship rates of content that is harmful to Sina’s business interests and content
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that is harmful to government interests can also demonstrate that agency loss is not
simply due to a lack of capacity, but rather due to deliberate and strategic shirking.
3.3.2 Event Data
Users seek information at different rates depending on the type of event, and
more user attention is usually more threatening to the government. Because Sina
is concerned with audience demand, they may increase or decrease their censorship
efforts in response to audience interest and, by proxy, sensitivity. To see how censor-
ship implementation varied by audience demand for information for sensitive events,
I used data from annual “blue books,” policy briefs written for government cadres,
on “social opinion and emergency management” compiled by the Institute for Public
Opinion Research of Shanghai Jiao Tong University and published by the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences. These blue books collate reports written by academics,
government officials, and policy experts and offer suggestions for policy changes and
improvements in the coming year. Using these events as a sample ensures that I am
analyzing events that public opinion experts found noteworthy, and where “public
opinion supervision” (舆论监督) and/or “public opinion guidance” (舆论引导) was
potentially necessary. These reports include 300 events (60 events for each year from
2010-2014) ranked by an index of search volume across several services. Each year’s
cases are selected from the top 1200 events with the highest search volume index13
based on their designation as a “public opinion emergency” that would be salient to
opinion and thought workers, the intended audience of these “blue books.”
13The search volume index is calculated as the average of news search volume, social networking
platform search volume, blog search volume, Sina Weibo search volume, video search volume, and
WeChat Public Accounts search volume.
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3.3.3 Censorship Outcomes Data
For each of the events above, I measure how thoroughly Sina carried out censorship
on its platform by searching large datasets of historical Sina Weibo posts for the
exact content targeted for censorship in logs. For this analysis I use two datasets that
measure censorship on the Sina Weibo platform: Free Weibo and Weiboscope. The
Free Weibo dataset includes 47 million weibo posts spanning from 2009-2018 and the
Weiboscope dataset includes 226 million posts from only 2012.14 Using these data I
compare the instructions in the logs to actual censorship outcomes at the event level.
To compare log content to actual Weibo post content, I first had research assis-
tants manually identify logs relevant to each of the 320 events from “blue books” by
searching within a month window on either side of the event date. For each relevant
log, research assistants then extracted the full content text from logs, stripping away
instructions on censorship and government directives that usually go along with log
text. After content from relevant logs was extracted, I searched large databases of
censorship outcomes for exact or near-exact text matches to each individual log’s
content.
Running several searches of 273 million Weibo posts is not a trivial task. To
identify exact or near-exact matches to posts mentioned in the logs, I needed to build
a rudimentary search engine, building an inverted index of each of the Weibo posts
in these large databases. For each log, I then scored the relevance of each post in the
two large databases of Weibo Posts using the Okapi BM25 ranking algorithm. The
Okapi BM25 algorithm was the gold standard for search engine ranking prior to recent
advances in deep learning and was the core technology behind the Bing search engine
for several years. With each post in these databases ranked according to relevance to
the text extracted from the logs, research assistants then identified posts from each
14Both datasets are constructed by recording a post soon after it has been created and later
querying for that post at fixed intervals to see if the post has been censored or deleted.
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set of search results that exactly or almost exactly matched the post targeted in logs.
Results were considered near-exact matches if they contained the entire query text
with either small editions, or a a few words replaced with synonyms, homophones, or
homoglyphs. Using the final dataset of retrieved matches, I estimated the proportion
of posts that were actually censored by Sina Weibo for each event. The results of this
procedure are visualized in Figure 3.1.
3.4 Empirical Implications and Results
Figure 3.1: Censorship Rate of Retrieved Weibo Posts Mentioned in Logs
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Each point on the figure represents a event where posts were retrieved and its size is propor-
tional to how many posts were retrieved. The y-axis, “rate of censorship implementation”
is the number of retrieved posts that were censored over the total number of posts retrieved.
The x-axis, “public interest in the event” is the search volume index gathered from blue
books. The regression line and confidence intervals are from a weighted LOESS model. The
average rate of censorship implementation is .38.
49
3.4.1 Corporate Delegation Leads to Agency Loss
I argue that incomplete censorship is due in part to a clash between the market
logic driving the behavior of private companies and the logic of control that guides
governments. In other terms, market demand for information sometimes clashes
with the informational preferences of government actors. In this section, I argue
that corporate delegation leads to agency loss for three main reasons. First, market
competition incentivizes Sina to prefer to censor less than its competitors, leading
to a race to the bottom. Second, Sina Weibo is technically limited in its ability
to comply with government directives, resulting in agency loss. Third, Sina Weibo
deliberately shirks in order to minimize the cost of censorship and to minimize impact
of censorship on the usability of its platform.
The logs provide many examples of Sina Weibo’s concerns about censoring more
than competitor, Tencent Weibo. In one instance Sina Weibo was instructed to delete
all content related to a murder case that had garnered much public interest. Accord-
ing to logs, Sina Weibo monitored the compliance of Tencent Weibo, alerted the
Supervision Department to their non-compliance, and delayed implementation of di-
rectives until they could be assured that Tencent had also complied with directives.15
In another example, the Network Management Office ordered Sina Weibo to remove
a popular account on their service. After seeing that Tencent had not complied with
removing the same user on their platform, Sina Weibo drafted a response to the Net-
work Management Office: “Since Tencent hasn’t deleted the account, we are unable
to delete the account at this point in time.” In several other cases, Sina waited until
Tencent complied to implement directives to delete user accounts. During several
15Log entry from December 26, 2011 reads: Supervision Department demands to eliminate related
content to the Henan Shenqiu murder case that caused the death of four children and injury of one
child. Currently, we told Supervision Department that there are many related posts on Tencent
Weibo and asked Tan Chao to negotiate. They have not yet responded. Previously, we censored
any searches of the incident but didn’t eliminate everything. Currently, the parameter is to process
anything attacking the party or government policy. If there are other situations, report immediately.
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sensitive events such as the annual Spring Festival Gala—a Chinese propaganda va-
riety show and most-watched television show on the planet16—Sina Weibo instructed
employees to avoid censoring more comments on the official television broadcaster’s
account than competitor Tencent. Sina also went to great lengths to limit positive
news about Tencent on its platform. When news broke about a mass purge of bots
on Tencent, Sina Weibo employees were instructed to prevent retweets of posts that
praised Tencent’s actions. Similarly, when Xi Jinping visited Tencent, Sina Weibo em-
ployees were instructed to prevent retweets of all related posts. Conservatively, these
patterns in logs suggest that Sina Weibo’s concerns about remaining competitive with
Tencent drove many of their decisions to comply with directives. Preferences to cen-
sor slightly less than competitors, and the low level of implementation of directives
is consistent with a race to the bottom.
Though we observe Sina deliberately disobeying directives in logs, in many in-
stances, it seems that Sina’s poor censorship performance is due to a lack of capacity.
In Sina’s IPO documents they claimed, “although we attempt to monitor the content
posted by users on our platform, we are not able to effectively control or restrict
content generated or placed on our platform by our users.” This statement appears
to be at least partially accurate. In some logs, Sina Weibo appears overwhelmed.
During a major collective action incident in 2012 involving mass protest and several
self-immolations in Tibet, Sina Weibo struggled to keep up with a large magnitude
of takedown requests about Tibet. At one point, Sina Weibo employees sent an SOS
to all department heads as they struggled to mobilize enough employees to meet in-
creasing censorship demands.17 Even in less dire circumstances, Sina Weibo appears
16Viewership of the New Year’s Gala is around 700 million. In 2012, Guinness World Records
gave the show a audience of 498.7 million and named it the, “Most Watched National Network TV
Broadcast.” See http://www.webcitation.org/71y5Jcwx5.
17Log entry from February 1, 2012 reads: Recently there have been a lot of demands to delete
posts about Tibet!! There is no way we can add this many banned keywords; if we do so, the rate of
posts needing investigating will increase too much. We have already added several keywords related
to Tibetan independence, Communist Party [policy in Tibet], [police] killings, but the number of
keywords keeps increasing... I don’t know what to say!! Every department head, please disseminate!
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to perform relatively poorly. In Figure 3.1, we see that Sina Weibo usually does not
perfectly follow through with the decisions to comply with censorship directives. The
average rate of censorship of Sina Weibo posts from the Free Weibo and Weiboscope
databases that exactly match posts in the logs is .38. This low rate of censorship im-
plementation may be for one of two reasons: unintentional low capacity, or deliberate
shirking.
To test whether Sina’s poor performance was exclusively due to low censorship
capacity, I identified all logs that referenced news events about Sina Weibo that
were potentially damaging to the company’s reputation or bottom line. All posts
mentioning Sina had already been labeled by research assistants, making the search
easier. In total I identified three such news events in the logs: 1) discussions of Sina’s
IPO, 2) discussions of new research measuring the speed of Sina’s censorship, and 3)
Reuters interviews with former Sina Weibo employees who worked as content censors.
To measure how well Sina followed through on these decisions to censor content, I
retrieved exact or near-exact matches of content mentioned in the logs from the Free
Weibo database using methods described in detail above. In total I retrieved 33 posts,
24 of which were censored, an implementation rate of .73. This rate of implementation
is significantly higher than the Blue Book rate mentioned earlier (.38) according to
a 2-sample chi-squared test of equality of proportions at the 95% confidence level.
This evidence suggests that Sina Weibo has the capability to more thoroughly censor
content in response to government directives, but chooses not to. I find that the low
rate of actual censorship is likely at least somewhat deliberate.
These quantitative measures are consistent with Sina’s general instructions about
how intensely to censor content. Employees are at times instructed to deliberately
shirk and to obstruct the process of censorship by delaying directives and prolonging
bargaining between delegating government agencies and Sina. In the days preceding
This is extremely urgent!!!
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the Southern Weekend editorial incident mentioned in the beginning of this chapter,
log documents begin with a general notice urged employees to “negotiate as much as
possible” and “defer implementation of censorship requests from the Supervision De-
partment and Internet Management Office,” Sina Weibo’s two chief regulators. The
notice went on to instruct employees to “not process too many user posts” and to “not
be too stringent.” Just three months earlier, a similar general notice had suggested
the opposite. Employees were urged to “tighten” their “control measures” and to
“resolutely eliminate all posts relating to negative incidents, rumors about the Polit-
buro Standing Committee and their families, collective action content, coups, power
struggles related to the 18th CCP Party Congress, Ling Jihua, Central Public Security
Bureau, Bo Xilai, etc.” But even this strongly worded notice instructed employees to
refrain from immediately implementing “especially unreasonable directives.”
Finally, as is the case in any workplace, part of Sina Weibo’s lack of capacity to
censor content comes from agency loss due to rogue or incompetent employees. Of
course, the individual who leaked this entire cache of documents to the press was a
Sina Weibo employee.
3.4.2 Bureaucratic Fragmentation Leads to Agency Loss
Leaked censorship logs from Sina Weibo do not depict a system of censorship
that is hierarchical, centralized and efficient. Rather, many bureaucracies appear
to have varying degrees of authority, do not appear to coordinate their censorship
directives, and appear to at times be in conflict with one another. Logs document 3
main bureaucracies in charge of censorship at Sina Weibo, and a long tail of other
bureaucracies with the power to issue directives to the company (see Figure 3.2). To
measure the relationship between fragmentation and agency loss, I calculate rates of
disobedience across multiple bureaucracies, and confirm that these patterns match
theoretical expectations. I then argue for two mechanisms behind this relationship.
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First, common agency of private internet companies gives them discretion about which
agency’s directives to follow. Second, the power to enforce directives is locally biased,
i.e. power is concentrated in the locality of an ICP’s headquarters.
Figure 3.2: Agencies and Individuals Influencing Censorship on Sina Weibo
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If bureaucratic fragmentation leads to agency loss, we should expect to see dif-
ferences in the responsiveness of Sina Weibo to certain bureaucracies. Three bu-
reaucracies are most commonly called: The Beijing Municipal Internet Propaganda
Management Office (Internet Management Office), the Public Information and In-
ternet Safety Supervision Department of the Beijing Public Security Bureau (Super-
vision Department), and the State Council Information Office (SCIO).18 Personnel
and budgets of the Internet Management Office and the Supervision Department are
controlled by the Beijing Municipal Government. In a handful of cases, the State
18The logs confirm much of the basic bureaucratic structures that monitor and direct censorship
at Sina Weibo as identified in Cairns (2016a).
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Council Information Office delegates directly to Sina Weibo, but most of the time it
issues instructions to the Supervision Department and Internet Management Office to
delegate to private internet companies. Though it has informal authority to delegate
to these agencies, it does not have leverage over budgets and personnel. Because
Beijing Municipal Government agencies are directly responsible for monitoring and
sanctioning Sina, they should be obeyed at higher rates than the State Council Infor-
mation Office. Beijing Municipal Government has strong incentives to keep Sina in
check, as they will ultimately bear responsibility for failure to manage Sina when they
are evaluated for promotion at the end of their terms. In the logs, I find that overall,
16% of all directives are disobeyed. Beijing municipal bureaucracies, the “Network
Management Office” and the “Supervision Department” are disobeyed at rates of 15%
and 17% respectively. By contrast, the SCIO is disobeyed 20% of the time. Though
these measures of disobedience do indicate that the SCIO is disobeyed more often
than Beijing bureaucracies, there are not enough SCIO directives to distinguish a
statistically significant difference in the two proportions. To address this limitation,
I examine the data for evidence for two theorized mechanisms linking bureaucratic
fragmentation to agency loss: common agency and local bias.
If common agency of private internet companies results in agency loss, we might
expect to see instances in the data where agencies delegating censorship send differ-
ent directives to Sina Weibo, and where Sina Weibo chooses to implement the more
lenient or less-specified directive. This is a very hard test to pass because the logs
are usually not detailed enough to show discrepancies between directives from two
agencies. Directives are usually not copied verbatim and are summarized, often in
shorthand. Despite this, there are a handful of logs where we observe behavior con-
sistent with common agency leading to agency loss. One such log involves large-scale
protests in the city of Shifang in July of 2012 over a copper plant local residents
believed was causing health problems. The Supervision Department, a Beijing mu-
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nicipal state public security organ directed Sina Weibo to remove all collective action
content from their site. At the same time, the Internet Management Office, a Beijing
municipal party propaganda organ directed Sina to remove a list of specific posts.19
The latter order was easier to implement and was unlikely to completely shut down
discussion of the event on Sina Weibo. Sina opted to ignore the first order and
implement the latter order.
This evidence has its limitations. These handful of accounts confirm that common
agency resulted in some agency loss, but it is impossible with these data to determine
the magnitude of this agency loss. Previous work on delegation, however, has shown
that in situations where there are multiple principals, agent discretion results in higher
agency loss than if there was only one delegating principal (Calvert et al., 1989).
If local bias results in agency loss, we can expect to observe two main things
from the log data. First, it should be uncommon for non-Beijing Municipal Govern-
ment agencies to appear in directives because non-Beijing bureaucracies—especially
non-Beijing local governments— should have very little power to sanction Sina for
non-compliance with directives. In the case of Sina, the company falls under the
jurisdiction of the provincial-level municipal government of Beijing, as Sina is head-
quartered in Beijing. To measure the distribution of directives sources, two research
assistants coded the source bureaucracy for all 8,427 unique censorship logs accord-
ing to specific instructions about what constituted a bureaucratic source. I manually
checked all of their labels and searched the database for any logs they may have
missed. The resulting distribution of bureaucracies can be seen in Table 3.1. Overall,
96.6 percent of directives come from Beijing Municipal bureaucracies. While other
provincial-level bureaucracies can send directives to Sina, only two out of 611 specified
19A log from July 3, 2012 reads: “Regarding the Shifang incident, the Supervision Department
is currently demanding that we eliminate any inflammatory and mobilizing content. The Internet
Management Office has no clear directives but has sent over a list of individual posts to process,
ordinary requests like these should be followed.”
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Table 3.1: Distribution of Bureaucracies Issuing Directives
Name Administrative
Rank
Beijing Directive
Count
Percent of
Directives
Beijing Municipal Internet
Management Office
Provincial-level
Municipality
Yes 310 50.65
Beijing Municipal Supervision
Department
Provincial-level
Municipality
Yes 269 43.95
Beijing Municipal Internet Po-
lice
Provincial-level
Municipality
Yes 8 1.31
Beijing Municipal Bureau of
Radio and Television
Provincial-level
Municipality
Yes 3 0.49
Shanghai Municipal Propa-
ganda Department
Provincial-level
Municipality
No 1 0.16
Guangzhou Municipal Supervi-
sion Department
Provincial-level
Municipality
No 1 0.16
State Council Information Of-
fice
National No 16 2.61
Ministry of Public Security of
the Central People’s Govern-
ment
National No 2 0.33
Central Military Commission
of the People’s Liberation
Army
National No 1 0.16
State Administration for In-
dustry and Commerce of the
People’s Republic of China
National No 1 0.16
directive sources in the logs are non-Beijing Municipal bureaucracies.20
If local bias results in agency loss, we should also see greater responsiveness to the
demands of the Beijing Municipal Government than other bureaucracies, particularly
the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau and the Beijing Municipal Propaganda
Department. To test this, research assistants coded all instances in the logs where
Sina Weibo employees were directed defend government Weibo accounts, monitoring
and deleting comments that were offensive to that particular agency. Of the accounts
Sina Weibo protected, 46% were Beijing Municipal Government accounts, 46% were
national-level government accounts, and 8% were non-Beijing provincial-level govern-
ment accounts. As Sina Weibo users are not overwhelmingly concentrated in Beijing,
this suggests that decisions to censor content are locally biased.
20One log includes a directive from the Shanghai Municipal Propaganda Department and another
from the Guangzhou Municipal Public Security Bureau.
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Sina also appears to censor more efficiently when an event is salient to the Beijing
Municipal Government. In the aftermath of a flash flood in Beijing, citizens tried
to organize vigils for victims of the flood. Many logs related to this event indicate
the Supervision Department and the Internet Management Office’s keen interest in
thoroughly removing this mobilizing content from Sina Weibo.21 There was not much
interest in this particular event according to the blue book measures (in blue books,
the degree of interest in events is a proxy for their politial sensitivity to the national
government), and it appears to be an outlier in Figure 3.1. Censorship of this event
was much more efficiently implemented than other blue book events at all levels of
interest in the event (see Figure 3.1). This is consistent with the theory that local
bias due to fragmentation leads to agency loss in the process of censorship delegation.
3.5 Conclusion
Leaked censorship logs from Sina Weibo provide an intimate look into the conflict-
ing informational preferences of the Chinese government and private internet compa-
nies. They depict a system of multiple principals and multiple agents and a tangled
web of competing informational objectives. The logs show that the outcome of cen-
sorship involves many actors and does not necessarily reflect a unified government
strategy. Rather, government fragmentation and delegation to several corporate ac-
tors results in a system where the end result of censorship is generated by the aggre-
gated and contested preferences of central leadership, subnational governments, and
subnational elites passed through a final layer of distortion: media corporations. The
logs document outright disobedience of directives, even in highly sensitive situations,
and show how Sina Weibo strategically disobeys directives in order to gain a edge over
21A log from July 28, 2012 reads: “The Supervision Department requested we ramp up handling
and elimination of posts inciting and mobilizing netizens to hold vigils for victims of the Beijing
torrential rain disaster. A mobilizing post was discovered tonight and reported to the Supervision
Department and Internet Management Office.”
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competitor Tencent Weibo. While much of the academic literature and media depicts
China’s censorship apparatus as swift, centralized, focused, and sophisticated, the sys-
tem is often slow, fragmented, contentious, and low-tech, making censorship orders
difficult to enforce and giving social media companies a great deal of discretion over
what citizens do and do not see. Delegated censorship to private companies results in
significant agency loss that is then further compounded by political fragmentation.
3.6 Developments Since 2014
In the last few months of log data, China’s information control institutions un-
derwent significant reforms. These reforms seemed aimed at addressing the problem
of fragmentation of China’s system of information control. In 2014, the Cyberspace
Administration of China (CAC) assumed its role as China’s chief regulator of cy-
berspace. The CAC is a joint party and state organ that houses the SIIO (which is
a continuation of the SCIO22), and the General Office of the Central Leading Group
for Internet Security and Informatization which reports directly to the Central Com-
mittee of the Chinese Communist Party. The creation of the CAC gave party and
state organs unambiguous authority over provincial and municipal bureaucracies reg-
ulating private internet companies such as Sina Weibo.23 It is unclear from available
data whether or not these reforms succeeded in reducing agency loss resulting from
political fragmentation. Since these reforms, however, Sina and Tencent still appear
to resist and defy regulations.
In 2015, the CAC threatened to shut down Sina Weibo due to insufficient censor-
ship.24 In 2017, the CAC imposed “maximum fines” on Sina Weibo, Tencent, and
Baidu for “failing to fulfill their management duties and violating China’s Cyber Se-
22Technically, the SCIO was referred to as the SIIO after 2011. In late 2011 reforms, the SCIO’s
rank was elevated so that it directly reported to the State Council.
23See full report on the CAC here.
24See Wall Street Journal article here.
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curity Law.”25 In 2018 Sina was ordered by the CAC to suspend “key portals such
as its hot search site and portal on celebrities and their personal lives for a week”
due to its violation of “relevant internet laws and regulations and spread illegal in-
formation.”26 In 2018 the CAC suspended popular social networking site, Zhihu for
one week for “lax supervision and the spread of illegal information.”27 In late 2018
the CAC ordered the suspension of news aggregators for several weeks due to “il-
legal” information sharing. Sina Weibo has responded by expanding its efforts to
censor content through crowdsourcing and gamification, offering iPads to the best
“Weibo Supervisors,” users who volunteer their efforts to help Sina clean up harmful
content.28
These developments are interesting. While Sina appears to increase efforts to
police harmful information, it does so through crowd-sourcers, in an attempt to cut
costs. In recent state media, the authorities noted that despite these increased efforts,
they “are not fully performing their duties,”29 indicating that recentralization has yet
to solve problems of delegation.
3.7 Beyond China
Tensions and alliances between corporations and government actors, as well as
government delegation to corporations, are relevant far beyond the case of censorship
in China. The fraught alliance between social media companies and governments is
representative of a greater trend beyond the Chinese context, in authoritarian and
democratic politics alike. Corporations, especially in the realm of surveillance and
data analytics are operating on the behalf of governments to spy on citizens, en-
25See Global Times article here: http://www.webcitation.org/71y4srDVO, and see a The Diplo-
mat article here: http://www.webcitation.org/71y4v72U0.
26See http://www.webcitation.org/71y4wnS1A.
27See http://www.webcitation.org/71y52ogK6.
28See http://www.webcitation.org/71y53kuQE.
29See http://www.webcitation.org/71y55KoD9.
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force copyright laws, censor information, and repress government opponents. These
alliances represent a “broader trend of neoliberal restructuring, in which political
authority and decision-making power are taken out of the public realm and trans-
ferred to private environments, often underpinned by commercial and market logics”
(Crouch, 2004; Hintz , 2016). Since the 2016 elections, it became increasingly clear
how difficult it would be to hold social media companies accountable for their actions.
Behaviors that are in the public interest, such as cleaning up bot accounts, prevent-
ing the spread of fake news, identifying and disrupting foreign influence campaigns,
monitoring hate speech, preventing the spread of violence, and removing bad actors
are often in conflict with fundamental profit motivations and concerns about compet-
itiveness. It took years for Twitter to take any meaningful action on bot accounts,
and they did so only under extreme public pressure, due to fears of a hit to monthly
active user statistics that would reduce its stock price.30
As the Snowden leak revealed, the PRISM program gave the NSA authority to
request that Microsoft, Facebook, Apple, and Google provide data matching key-
words approved by a U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (FISA) Court ruling. At
large tech companies, requests for information controls are released publicly, showing
a tension between corporate and consumer preferences and states’ logic of social con-
trol (Tanash et al., 2015). Private companies often refuse requests out of concerns
for their users’ preferences, their profitability, and their reputation. An example of
these conflicts is Apple’s refusal to cooperate with FBI requests following the San
Bernardino terrorist attack. The FBI sought to compel Apple to break their own
encryption so that the FBI could obtain information on one of the suspect’s iPhones.
Obeying such a request, Apple said, would “threaten the security of our customers,”
which Apple has trumpeted as an advantage over competitor Google. In 2014, they
boasted, “unlike our competitors, Apple cannot bypass your passcode and therefore
30See http://www.webcitation.org/71y56kNiL.
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cannot access [customer] data.” Despite public statements about Apple’s company
values, their refusal is likely in part driven by concerns about profits and competi-
tiveness. Like Sina, Apple is not keen on giving into government demands that would
put it at a competitive disadvantage.
The relevance of tensions and partnerships between state and corporate actors is
also indicative of trends in Chinese reform that not only includes corporate actors
in the policymaking process, but uses corporations as labs to create structures and
institutions that can later be subsumed into the state. For example, the very process
of censorship described in this chapter has already been partially subsumed into the
state. Employees working in editorial functions at internet content producers (ICPs)
in China can no longer remain on private payrolls. This means that according to
Chinese law, the employees who censor content can no longer be employees of Sina
Weibo, but now must be employees of a government agency such as the Network Man-
agement Office or the Supervision Department. Whether or not this solves principal
agent problems identified in the censorship system has yet to be seen, but control
over the internet has been tightening at a rapid pace over the last few years.
Other such plans to subsume institutions borne out of corporations seem on the
horizon. China is now relying on the infrastructure of Alibaba’s Alipay to serve
as the technical back-end to a national “social credit system” which merges social
and financial data to give users a score that can selectively restrict access to state
and commercial services, increase monitoring and policing of certain “untrustworthy”
people, and even determine what jobs an individual can have. Even more interesting
are the institutions that are being created within large companies such as Alibaba
that mirror government institutions. Alibaba’s disputes between suppliers and cus-
tomers are resolved by a jury of one’s peers and sentences are doled out by impartial
judges; these roles are given to users on Alibaba’s platform. Judges and juries decide
how to split up money held in escrow for disputed transactions made in the system.
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This corporate system alleviates much of the strain put on rigid and ineffective legal
institutions (Liu and Weingast , 2017). Despite being a competitor to the existing
bureaucratic system, the government appears to tolerate its existence. It is conceiv-
able and consistent with current trends that these corporate structures might one day
inform reform of legal institutions, or be subsumed into the current legal system in
China.
The trends outlined above and the relationship between Sina Weibo and govern-
ment actors in China may represent a potentially transformative shift in how states
and corporations interact. More nimble and adaptive corporate structures may help
authoritarian governments leverage data to manage and monitor public opinion. Al-
ternatively, corporate profit motives may prove to increase conflicts between state
and society, leading to reform or instability.
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CHAPTER IV
Reassessing the Targets of China’s Online
Censorship Apparatus
What are the bounds of the Chinese government’s tolerance of online political
expression? Following the publication of a series of noteworthy papers by King et
al. (2013, 2014), a consensus has emerged contending that the government tolerates
political criticism and selectively targets content with collective action potential. Nev-
ertheless, we continue to witness numerous cases of censorship, arrests, and repression
of users who post online criticisms, political humor, and discussions of leadership that
have little to do with collective action. In this chapter, I demonstrate that the Chi-
nese government has a broader agenda to constrict the space for counter-hegemonic
discourse, which includes the suppression of both political criticism and content with
collective action potential. By drawing on direct measures of government intent as
recorded in leaked censorship documents, I find that although censors frequently
target collective action content, they are even more likely to target discussions of
leadership and government criticisms.
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4.1 Introduction
Since mid-July of 2017, all images and mentions of Winnie-the-Pooh have been
scrubbed from the Chinese internet. This is because, according to a popular meme,
China’s “core leader” Xi Jinping resembles the bear. While censorship of Winnie-
the-Pooh in China may seem aberrant, censorship of government-critical content and
seemingly innocuous content such as images of tattoos, or pride flags is common-
place.1 This is puzzling because, according to popular consensus in the political
science literature, the government should not be targeting anything but content with
“collective action potential” (King et al., 2013, 2014). In this chapter, I demonstrate
that the Chinese government’s censorship agenda is far broader than the existing
literature suggests. While the state cares about content with collective action poten-
tial, it cares also about constricting space for anti-regime content, whether or not this
content can lead to on-the-ground protest.
Understanding the bounds of the Chinese state’s tolerance for political expression
is important because crossing these bounds can have real-world consequences for
ordinary Chinese citizens. Countless citizens are not only censored, but imprisoned
or interrogated for criticisms they write about government leaders (Tager et al., 2017).
For example, in April 2017, a man was sentenced to two years in prison for calling
the president “steamed buns.” By underestimating the importance of criticism, we
may be limiting our understanding of broader state repression in China.
Using an original dataset of 8,427 leaked censorship logs from popular social media
company Sina Weibo, I compare the distribution of content targeted for censorship
to empirical expectations of the collective action potential. I find that, while censors
target collective action content at high rates, they target government criticism and
discussions of leadership even more.
Finally, I suggest that research on censorship—and state repression more broadly—
1See: http://www.webcitation.org/72D1Zfksb
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ought to directly measure and not assume government intent. I challenge assumptions
that “the state’s revealed preferences” can be uncovered by analyzing censorship out-
comes and suggest that the randomized experiment in King et al. (2014) and the big
data analysis in King et al. (2013) may underestimate the importance of non-collective
action content. Because many non-government actors influence what is and is not
censored in China, the outcome of censorship is an inaccurate measure of government
intent.
4.2 Collective Action Potential vs. Low Censorship Capacity
The collective action potential hypothesis argues against a “conventional wisdom”
that the main target of censorship is criticism of the government. Instead, the authors
argue that “the purpose of the censorship program is to reduce the probability of
collective action by clipping social ties whenever any collective movements are in
evidence or expected” (King et al., 2013, 326). They find that “posts are censored if
they are in a topic area with [collective action potential] and not otherwise. Whether
or not the posts are in favor of the government, its leaders, and its policies has no
measurable effect on the probability of censorship” (King et al., 2013, 339). For
an example of collective action potential content, the others cite “posts on a local
Wenzhou Web site expressing support for Chen Fei, a environmental activist who
supported an environmental lottery to help local environmental protection.” This
content was not anti-government but was still censored. For government criticism, the
authors are less clear about their coding rules. The authors argue repeatedly that the
patterns they uncover in the data “seem to clearly expose government intent” (King
et al., 2013, 326). Related theories report salutary effects (for the state) of opening
space for criticism. Some claim that the government may benefit from watchdogs
in media that identify corrupt subordinates and popular grievances (Dimitrov et al.,
2013; Malesky and Schuler , 2011; Egorov et al., 2009b; Lorentzen, 2014). Others claim
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that circumscribed spaces for criticism can be used to collect grievances and feedback
on governance and policy proposals (Chen and Xu, 2016; Truex , 2014; Gueorguiev
and Malesky , 2018).
While the collective action potential hypothesis focuses on a universal government
intent behind incomplete censorship, many works focus instead on how and why the
state is unable to perfectly control information. Others suggest that the government
lacks capacity to censor as completely as it would like due to state-society conflict
(Esarey and Xiao, 2011; Diamond , 2010) or government fragmentation (Han, 2018;
Cairns , 2017). Others suggest that market competition in the media can lead to cir-
cumscribed space for critical information to spread (Stockmann, 2013; Miller , 2018).
4.3 Data and Methods
4.3.1 Leaked Log Data
In this chapter I test the collective action potential hypothesis by analyzing the
content of a new database of 8,427 censorship logs from popular social media company
Sina Weibo. These logs are a complete set of documents from April 2011 to late 2014
that record censorship orders and daily business at Sina Weibo’s content censorship
office in Tianjin, China. These documents include government censorship directives,
the content to be censored, management decisions to implement or defy these direc-
tives, and other general notices to content moderation employees. Logs are meant to
share information with content moderation employees working in different shifts in
an effort to minimize duplicated management effort. This corpus of documents was
leaked to the Committee to Protect Journalists by a former employee working as a
content moderator at Sina Weibo.
These data are fundamentally different than the data used in past analyses. Many
analyses of censorship have drawn inferences from censorship outcomes by sampling
67
social media posts and periodically checking to see if that post has been deleted at
later stages. In contrast, log data are completely separate from the mechanisms of
censorship as experienced on the user end. Censorship logs from Sina Weibo log
all government censorship directives they receive. These directives are created by
propaganda and public security bureaucracies who proactively decide what is and is
not off-limits. Along with the text of directives, Sina Weibo managers write notes to
inform employees of how/if they are to implement the directive.
In this chapter, I argue that these data are better equipped to measure govern-
ment intent than censorship outcomes because they are unadulterated by the many
non-government actors who clearly have a say in what is and is not censored on the
user end. King et al. (2013, 2014) indirectly measure government intent through cen-
sorship outcomes (whether or not posts on social media, blogs, and other platforms
were censored), claiming that these data expose “revealed preferences through [the
government’s] censorship behavior,” despite the many non-government actors (such
as private internet companies) who decide what content is and is not visible. The
leaked logs capture government intent before it is distorted by these non-government
actors. These data are also well-suited to test the collective action potential hypoth-
esis because they were generated during the same period as data were collected for
both papers by King et. al., containing a complete set of logs from 2011-2014, holding
the time period of censorship observed by both studies constant.
These logs are from a single social media company, Sina Weibo. As such, there are
limits to the external validity of these inferences. That being said, during the time of
the analysis, Sina Weibo boasted over half a billion registered users and was ranked in
the top 3 social networks by monthly active users. Many of the logs indicate as well
that the same directives sent to Sina Weibo were also sent to competitor Tencent.
Together, Sina and Tencent represent the vast majority of the social media market.
Directives to Sina Weibo come from Beijing-based regulators. The largest number of
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ICPs are registered in Beijing so any bias toward Beijing in this analysis does not
largely impact generalizability of inferences. This is also less of a concern since the
topic distributions uncovered in this analysis are similar to those measured by Cribben
et al. (2018) from “internal documents from Hunan Province” during the Hu Jintao
period (2009-2010).
4.3.2 Coding Procedure
Along with two research assistants, I manually labeled each log according to the
content of posts targeted for censorship. In total, I kept track of 17 top-level topic
categories and 51 more specific secondary categories. Nearly all topic categories have
high intercoder reliability (see Table A.1 in the appendix). Topic categories were
developed inductively, starting with categories existing literature posited were of the-
oretical interest. New categories were added when they could not neatly fit into any
of the existing categories. These topic categories include mentions of government
leadership, government criticism, collective action, and corruption, topics of theoreti-
cal interest in the literature reviewed above. A brief description of content categories
relevant to this analysis can be found in Table 4.1. Complete coding diagrams can
be found in Section A.1.2 in the appendix.
Labeling censorship logs took nearly three years of continuous work due to the lack
of structure in the raw data. Log data included a mix of data formats (images, text,
video), and were written in a jargon-heavy shorthand that is difficult to understand
without training. All of these hurdles made it infeasible to use automated methods
of text analysis. Raw documents from the leak had no clear and consistent delimiters
between logs, so approximately 10,000 logs needed to be manually segmented before
further processing. After this, approximately 2000 duplicates were identified using the
Smith-Waterman edit distance algorithm (Smith and Waterman, 1981)and reviewed
manually.
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I hired two research assistants to read and categorize each log. All coding rules
were provided to research assistants in flow-chart form. Research assistants were
instructed to follow these flow charts as they coded. In total, research assistants and
I made 573,036 individual content categorizations. Before coding began, I defined
and diagramed all content categories, trained each coder, and performed periodic
intercoder reliability checks. In order to achieve adequate intercoder reliability, each
coder needed months of training. The two final coders were selected from an initial
pool of 6 coders who went through the complete training process and labeled at least
1000 logs on their own. These coders were selected based on their demonstrated
understanding of the coding scheme and their consistent quality of work.
I made a concerted effort to conform to the coding rules for concepts defined by
King et al. (2013), but the original coding scheme required some adjustments due to
the vagueness of concept definitions and differences in the nature of categories (this
analysis uses mixed membership). The concept “collective action potential” discussed
in King et al. (2013) is very broad, encompassing “any event that has the potential
to cause collective action.” In my own coding scheme, I worried about the meaning-
fulness of such a category since almost any event or individual has some potential
to cause collective action. It was not clear whether the authors drew a line for con-
cept membership above a certain propensity to cause collective action. Nonetheless,
the authors define “collective action potential” as events that belong to one or more
of the following sub-categories: protest, individuals/activists, and nationalism.2 I
measured each of these subcategories of “collective action potential”—as defined by
King et al. (2013)—separately. Coding rules for each of these categories can be found
2The full definition is as follows: “events which (a) involve protest or organized crowd formation
outside the Internet; (b) relate to individuals who have organized or incited collective action on the
ground in the past; or (c) relate to nationalism or nationalist sentiment that have incited protest or
collective action in the past.” I measured each component of “collective action potential” as defined
by King et al. (2013) (a) as “protest,” and (b) as “social activism,” both under an umbrella category
“collective action.” So as not to miss any other forms of collective action, I also measured concepts
“strikes,” “petitions,” and “social groups.” I measured (c) separately as “nationalism.”
70
in Section A.1.2 the appendix. To be conservative, I approximated collective action
potential using a broader category that encompassed each of these components and
a few additional sub-categories. For clarity sake, I call this concept simply “collec-
tive action.” This category includes content that either “1) mentions or implies an
event where a group of people took action together to achieve a common objective,
or 2) mentions or implies an individual or group of individuals who are advocating
on behalf of a social, religious, or ethnic group.” This is a broader conceptualization
of collective action than King et al. (2013). It includes online collective actions such
as using candle emojis to participate in a digital vigil after the death of Nobel Peace
Prize Winner and dissident Liu Xiaobo, or the collective signing of online petitions
and political documents such as Charter 08 for which Liu was sentenced to an 11-year
prison term. As such, if anything, the differences in coding scheme will over-estimate
the prevalence of “collective action potential content” as originally defined by the
authors.
The coding rules for the concept “government criticism” were not provided in the
text or supplementary materials. Though I planned on reverse-engineering coding
rules from post-level data to address this problem, unfortunately post-level replication
data are unavailable due to storage issues.3 Instead, I defined government criticism
as content that satisfies membership requirements for the “government” parent cat-
egory and either “(a) speaks ill of, criticizes, or ridicules government leaders or their
families, government policies, or government institutions or (b) includes instructions
that mention “negative” content or content that ‘attacks or ‘mocks”’ (see Table 4.1).
Other concepts measured in this content analysis are diagrammed and described in
detail in Section A.1.2 in the appendix.
3Gueorguiev and Malesky (2018) were unable to obtain replication data and instead performed a
“pseudo-replication” on the aggregate data rather than the raw data. They find that many of the
criticisms that make it into the sample are solicited by the Chinese government in the first place in
processes known as “public opinion consultation” and “public opinion supervision.”
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Table 4.1: Brief Description of Topic Categories
Category Parent
Category
Description
Government - The content mentions or implies a Chinese government
institution, organization, or bureaucracy, a Chinese gov-
ernment official of any rank or position, their family
members or their partners/mistresses, a Chinese govern-
ment policy, or a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE).
Government
Leadership
Government The content mentions or implies a Chinese government
official of any rank or position, their family members, or
their partners/mistresses.
Government
Criticism
Government The content speaks ill of, criticizes, attacks, mocks, or
ridicules government leaders or their families, govern-
ment policies, or government institutions.
Political
Humor
Government The content involves mockery, humor, or satire of gov-
ernment leaders or their families, government policies,
or government institutions.
Corruption Crime The content mentions or implies any of the following:
1) misuse of local government office or local government
funds, 2) sexual misconduct of local government officials
3) a local government official and/or his/her family fi-
nancially benefiting from a government post.
Collective
Action
- The content either 1) mentions or implies an event where
a group of people took action together to achieve a com-
mon objective, or 2) mentions or implies an individual
or group of individuals who are advocating on behalf of
a social, religious, or ethnic group.
Social Ac-
tivism
Collective
Action
The content mentions or implies advocacy on behalf of
a social group. Content can either mention a group
directly, or mention a member of a social group (i.e.
Chen Guangcheng).
Protest Collective
Action
The content mentions or implies a street protest, march,
or collective walk.
4.3.3 Empirical Expectations
If the collective action hypothesis is correct, we should expect the the vast majority
of censored content to be related to “collective action” with little-to-no censorship of
posts related to discussions of crime, government criticism, or discussion of leaders.
In contrast, a large number of logs cases related to discussions of crime, government
criticism, or discussion of leaders would provide evidence against a strong version of
the collective action hypothesis.
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4.4 Results
Contrary to empirical expectations of the collective action potential hypothesis,
I find that discussions of leadership are targeted most frequently, that government
criticism is almost twice as likely to be targeted for censorship as is collective action
content, and that corruption, collective action, crime, and a wide range of other
topics are censored at similar rates. Further, it appears that government criticism
and discussions of leadership became more frequently targeted in the Xi Jinping era
(2013-) while collective action content became less frequently targeted, a break from
the Hu Jintao years covered in the data (2011-2012). The distribution of content
targeted by governments in the log data provides clear evidence that the collective
action potential hypothesis overstates the importance of collective action potential
and understates the importance of government criticism, discussions of leadership,
discussions of corruption, and discussions of crime.
Government-related posts are targeted most frequently in logs, meaning that gov-
ernment directives to Sina Weibo are most frequently about the government (74.30%
of logs). Government directives target collective action content in only 23.06% of
logs. Discussions of government leadership are the second largest topic, representing
50.01% of logs. Government criticism is targeted much more frequently than collective
action, at 39.29%. Political humor makes up 10.41% of logs. Posts about corruption
are nearly as common as collective action posts, and make up 18.68% of logs. The
distribution of government, collective action, and corruption topics are visualized in
Figure 4.1; the distribution of all topics representing greater than 5% of logs can be
seen in 4.2. Below I perform a few robustness checks to make sure that the distribu-
tion of log content is not driven by mixed membership of categories, unusual events
happening in particular years, or due to the influence of potential over-censorship on
the Sina Weibo platform.
Each log can belong to several categories (mixed membership). It is therefore
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Figure 4.1: Topic proportions overall, by year, and without mixed CA membership
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Figure 4.2: Topic proportions for category proportions over .05
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possible that the high prevalence of censorships related to government content was
driven by a mixed membership with collective action. I therefore recalculated the
frequencies of each category, excluding logs that have mixed membership with the
collective action category. After adjusting proportions for mixed membership, results
do not appear to be driven by mixed membership (see Figure 4.1). This highlights
an important difference between both of King, Pan, and Roberts’ approach to topic
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categories and the one used in this analysis. In their work, collective action and
government criticism are treated as mutually exclusive categories. In this analysis,
9.41% of logs target posts that contain collective action content and government
critical content. Since the authors do not report any coding rules for the government
criticism category, it’s hard to know how or if a line was drawn between the two
concepts.
Finally, because in late 2011 and 2012, an unusual number of high-profile government-
related events took place, I examined logs across years to test that these findings are
not driven by the unique events of late 2011 and 2012, namely the Bo Xilai affair,
the 18th Party Congress, and speculation about leadership transitions as Hu Jintao
retired from office. This might drive a lot of criticism or discussions of leadership
in the leaked log data. In Figure 4.3 the results by year show the opposite trend:
collective action and corruption were more heavily targeted in directives in 2011 and
2012 than they were in 2013 and 2014. In later years under President Xi Jinping,
it appears that government leadership and government criticism became much more
frequently targeted.
Figure 4.3: Venn diagram of government, col. action, corruption topics by year
2013 201420122011
4.5 Discussion
In this chapter, I tested the collective action hypothesis by measuring the topic
proportions of content targeted for censorship from a leaked dataset of censorship logs
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from Sina Weibo. I measured the distribution of topic categories by manually labeling
content according to several topic categories of theoretical interest. I found that
contrary to the empirical expectations of the collective action potential, discussions of
crime, government criticism, and discussion of leaders are more frequently targeted for
censorship than collective action content. In addition, a diverse array non-collective-
action topics are censored at non-negligible rates.
4.5.1 Beyond Collective Action Potential
If collective action potential is not exclusively targeted, then what explains the
diversity in censored content? The literature offers two main explanations for this
diverse array of content targeted for censorship. First, this diversity can be explained
by the state’s preference for reducing the prevalence of counter-hegemonic discourse
by targeting influential people rather than categories of content. Second, this diver-
sity can be explained by diversity in actors involved in censorship who often have
conflicting preferences.
Past work suggests that the Chinese Communist Party controls information and
prevents challenges to it’s monopoly on power by reducing the influence of—or subsuming—
organizations and ideologies that are counter-hegemonic (Schurmann, 1966). We
might then expect that the state would target opinion leaders and groups of indi-
viduals who are engaging in counter-hegemonic discourse, even in cases where this
discourse has no collective action potential. Gallagher and Miller (2018) find that
users with high follower counts and retweets are more likely to be reported to the au-
thorities by social media companies regardless of the topic of relevant content shared.
This explanation extends the collective action hypothesis by re-situating it within an
earlier hypothesis by Schurmann (1966) about how the Chinese Communist Party
controls society through controlling ideology (targeting counterhegemonic discourse,
i.e. criticism of government, leadership, official party line) and organization (target-
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ing collective action potential by embedding the party in all organizations and social
groups).
Other work cites the many levels of government, bureaucracies and individuals
with a stake in censorship (Miller , 2018). The diversity of preferences of these gov-
ernment actors may explain the diversity in content targeted for censorship. Cribben
et al. (2018) find that central and local preferences for censorship differ substantially.
Diversity in actors involved in censorship was acknowledged in King et al. (2013)
as a potential limitation to claims of government intent.4 In traditional media, the
diversity of censorship objectives in China has been well-studied (Stockmann, 2013;
Brady , 2009; Shambaugh, 2007)
4.5.2 Why Government Intent Should Not be Inferred from Censorship
Outcomes
In King et al. (2013, 2014), the collective action hypothesis was tested by mea-
suring censorship outcomes and comparing the rate of censorship of collective action
to the rate of censorship of government criticism. These quantities, however, may
not accurately measure the intent of the government. For censorship outcomes to
accurately reflect government intention, one must assume that: 1) the government
acts uniformly as the sole actor involved in censorship (no non-government actors are
involved); 2) the government has a single, coherent censorship strategy; and 3) the
government can effectively delegate to agents of censorship. Below, I outline a series
of specific reasons why these assumptions are invalid, and why it is unlikely that the
research designs of King et al. (2013, 2014) accurately measure concepts of theoretical
interest.
Governments are not the only decision-makers behind what is and is not censored
4The authors concede that “in those instances when different agencies, leaders, or levels of gov-
ernment work at cross purposes, even the concept of a unitary intent or motivation may be difficult
to define, much less measure.”
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in China. In China, the government delegates to private internet companies to censor
on their behalf, and these internet companies have a lot of power. They routinely
disobey directives in pursuit of profits (Miller , 2018). Additionally, these compa-
nies censor for reasons unrelated to government concerns. They censor harassment,
pornography, and spam, as social media companies routinely do even outside of China.
Evidence from log data and interviews with journalists and researchers show that so-
cial media companies, and sometimes rogue employees, frequently censor on behalf
of celebrities or friends (Wang , 2016a,b; Cairns , 2017).5 Private internet companies
often censor content on their platform that is detrimental to the company’s interests,
such as unfavorable reports about the company’s IPO in the United States (Miller ,
2018). While King et al. (2014) acknowledge that corporate actors are involved in the
process, they do not consider whether their involvement in the process could result in
outcomes deviating from government intent; instead, they treat corporate delegation
as a black box.
Ordinary users also play a large role in determining what is censored. From cen-
sorship outcomes alone, it is impossible to determine whether a post was deleted as an
act of censorship or whether the original poster deleted it. As such, measures of “cen-
sorship” outcomes could include instances of self-censorship. Some individuals may be
pressured by family, friends, or coworkers to delete content or they may have second
thoughts after posting about the social desirability of the content they just shared. In
these cases, self-censorship can often be conflated with government-directed censor-
ship when looking at censorship outcomes. Content at internet companies in China is
flagged for manual review by ordinary users who click “report” buttons. These crowd-
sourcing systems identify objectionable content not from government directives, but
from signals of what netizens find socially undesirable.
5The source of Sina Weibo’s leak admitted that while at Sina, they “helped friends and strangers
get back accounts that had been removed and told them how to walk around sensitive words. I also
helped [influential users] find out which government agencies ordered the removal of their accounts”
(Wang , 2016b).
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The above ways in which censorship outcomes give an inaccurate read on the intent
behind censorship shows the significance of understanding state repression starting
at decisions and reading intent forward. This observation has been made previously
by Capoccia and Ziblatt (2010), who claim that comparative historical analyses of
democratization can overlook important determinants of democratization by reading
backward rather than reading forward. Backward inducing intent from outcomes of
censorship overlooks non-government actors and internal government dynamics that
affect what is and is not censored, often in ways that circumvent initial intent.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I demonstrated that the Chinese state’s tolerance for political
expression tolerates is much narrower than is currently appreciated. The state’s
broader agenda includes the suppression of both political criticism and content with
collective action potential. This corrective of King et al. (2013, 2014) is significant
because it shows that one or both of the following is true: 1) the Party-state is
weaker than we assume and lacks capacity to target censorship, as has been previously
assumed; 2) the Party-state cares a great deal about counter-hegemonic discourse,
and is focused primarily on reasserting party control over public spaces it does not
currently control.
Methodologically, this chapter stresses the significance of understanding state re-
pression starting at government decisions and reading intent forward. By focusing
on outcomes of censorship and reading backward, King et al. (2013, 2014) failed to
account for many ways in which censorship outcomes might not reflect government
intent, as private actors often countervail government interests, and ordinary users
participate in censorship. While discussions of the government logic behind censor-
ship are important, backward inducing intent from the roles the system seems to play
should be avoided, and can lead quickly to functionalism.
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CHAPTER V
Automated Detection of Chinese Government
Astroturfers Using Network and Social Metadata
5.1 Introduction
Astroturfing is the promotion of an opinion or propagation of information through
fabricated “grassroots” behaviors and/or “social movements.” It is a tactic that has
been used by tobacco and oil companies to promote support for policies that are
advantageous to their interests.1 Authoritarian governments and political parties
in democracies make use of similar tactics to suppress discussion or guide opinion.
Government astroturfers in China, popularly known as the “Fifty Cent Party” (五毛
党)2, are employees of a wide range of government bureaucracies who are tasked with
“guiding opinion” online. They post pro-regime messages on social media platforms,
deliberately hiding their identity, with the goal of appearing to be ordinary citizens.
While there is a growing literature in political science on bot detection (Stukal
et al., 2017), very little work has been done to detect astroturfers. While these
bot-detection methods must discriminate between humans and machines, astroturfer
1Evidence of campaigns and their effectiveness can be found in work by Cho et al. (2011).
2Government astroturfers in China are colloquially referred to as members of the “Fifty Cent
Party” (五毛党). They are so called because they are purportedly paid 0.5 RMB per post (0.07
USD) to post pro-regime commentary on social networks, online news channels, and other websites
with user-generated content. Their official title is usually some variant of “internet commentator”
(网络评论员)
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detection must differentiate one class of humans from another. Astroturfers, unlike
bots, are humans, usually posting manually, and often crafting custom messages.
Because the practice of government astroturfing involves hiding one’s identity and
appearing to be an ordinary user, differentiating an astroturfer from an ordinary user
is a difficult task. There has been very little scholarship dedicated to government
astroturfing, and there have been no successful attempts to identify government as-
troturfing in China. Computer scientists have tried to use unsupervised methods to
detect activity from government astroturfers, but they relied on text data and made
many assumptions about the text content of astroturfer posts. These methods were
unsuccessful, and researchers “located no evidence that any of [observed] users are
[Fifty Cent Party members]” (Yang et al., 2015).3
A key obstacle to the study of political astroturfing is the difficulty of data col-
lection. So as to prevent researcher-induced bias, analysis of astroturfing often re-
quires empirical ground truth4 data. Because of limited available data, researchers
have sometimes relied on a “you’ll know it when you see it” approach to identifying
astroturfers. For example, ethnographic research by Han (2015b,a) identifies astro-
turfers by searching for language that “[smells] strongly of official propaganda” (Han,
2015b). Though these users were likely to have indeed been astroturfers, there is a
small chance that some of those users’ opinions were genuinely in line with official
propaganda and they were commenting independently, and not on behalf of a govern-
ment organization. In China these users are called the “Volunteer Fifty Cent Party”
(自干五). Though Han’s analysis was careful, this “you know it when you see it” ap-
proach to astroturfing may introduce less careful researchers’ biases or preconceptions
about what astroturfing looks like. These biases may reflect popular conceptions of
3This is likely because text content alone can not adequately discriminate between government
astroturfers and ordinary citizens in the same way that non-text features can.
4“Ground truth” refers to information that has been gathered empirically rather than through
inference. In this analysis, “ground truth” refers to data where the identity of the commentator—
astroturfer or not—can be observed. If a model’s predictions resemble empirically observed “ground
truth,” this suggests that inferences from a model are of good quality.
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astroturfing as depicted in the media and academic literature. Many assumptions
about the Fifty Cent Party appear to be myths, most notably, the assumption that
astroturfers are paid piecemeal (50 cents per post).
Because of the difficulty of differentiating users with genuinely pro-regime opin-
ions from astroturfers, recent works have advocated the use of ground-truth data,
where the identity of government astroturfers has been somehow uncovered. That is,
leaks or public disclosures have identified that the true source of comments is astro-
turfers and not ordinary netizens. Keller et al. (2017) make use of publicly disclosed
astroturfing data from the Park campaign in South Korea to describe the behavior
of astroturfers during and after a highly contested election. In another ground-truth-
based study, King et al. (2016) estimate the number of astroturfer comments made
each year in China. They extrapolate from astroturfer comments reported to man-
agers via email as found in a cache of hacked emails from a local district Propaganda
Department in China. Research by King et al. (2016) asserts that astroturfing is not
about persuasion, and more about distraction through “cheerleading.”
The purpose of this paper is simply to outline a method for detecting astro-
turfers. However, work in progress that analyzes the content of posts identified using
these methods does not support the assertions of King et al. (2016). Instead, these
preliminary findings suggest that the purpose of astroturfing is to respond to “pub-
lic opinion emergencies” through agenda-setting, and dilution of negative sentiment
through posts with “positive energy (正能量).” More work however needs to be done
to fully understand whether astroturfing is effective and what the state’s objective
behind astroturfing is.
Though studies that make use of ground truth data avoid the problem of researcher-
induced biases and have no trouble disambiguating ordinary users with pro-government
positions from astroturfers, the data used for these analyses can come with their own
biases. Exclusively relying on these ground-truth datasets may limit our analysis to
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the moment in time captured by leaks or disclosures. Without a method of detecting
astroturfers, researchers risk becoming dependent on rare leaks or public disclosures
to study astroturfing. This forces researchers to either study astroturfing using cross-
sectional analyses, or assume that inferences from one cross-section can be applied to
others. This becomes a problem when leaked or publicly disclosed data are regionally
biased, involve highly specific subject areas, or cover a short span of time.
In this chapter, I outline a method of identifying government astroturfers that
can be validated usign ground truth data, but does not rely on it exclusively for the
analysis. This method leverages metadata that is commonly provided alongside text
features in social text scraped from the internet. Because behavioral patterns are
encoded in metadata, researchers can draw upon documentary sources to create rules
that differentiate astroturfer behavior from the behavior of ordinary users. To address
possible researcher induced bias, researchers can use ground truth data to validate
rules for discriminating ordinary users from astroturfer users. This approach involves
1) identifying work and behavior patterns that differentiate astroturfers from ordinary
users, 2) retrieving likely and unlikely astroturfer texts from large text corpora using
these rules, 3) training a binary text classifier with likely and unlikely astroturfer
texts, and 4) validating this classifier by comparing model predicted outcomes to
ground truth outcomes.
I utilize this approach to detect astroturfers in a large database of 70 million news
media comments from 19 popular news outlets that vary in their state-affiliation, level
of commercialization, and region. First, I identify behavioral patterns of astroturfers
using a in-depth study of a corpus of government documents and training manuals
(Miller , 2016). I create several rules that discriminate between astroturfers and ordi-
nary users using these sources and analyses. Second, I retrieve comments that satisfy
the rules outlined in the first step. Third, I train several binary classifiers to discrim-
inate between the comments retrieved in the second step from their complement in
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the corpus. Finally, I use ground truth data of leaked astroturfer comments from the
Zhanggong Propaganda Department to validate these models. Each classifier predicts
astroturfer comments from the Zhanggong leak with greater than 90% accuracy.
5.2 Identifying Government Astroturfers
In order to avoid researcher-induced bias, I use metadata rather than text content
to infer whether a user is an astroturfer or an ordinary user. In my data, metadata
includes IP address, post time, social network data from Weibo (a Chinese social me-
dia service similar to Twitter), comment likes, usernames, user locations, etc. These
metadata can be used to analyze comments without any assumptions about the syn-
tactical or dictional content of the comment text. Instead, using what is known
about government astroturfers’ network behavior and modal job responsibilities, re-
searchers can look for empirical patterns one would expect from only astroturfers and
not ordinary users.
If researchers can identify patterns in metadata that can convincingly discriminate
between ordinary and astroturfer users, they can make inferences about the identity
of astroturfers without relying on “ground truth” data. Inferences however, will only
be certain in the handful of cases where astroturfers identify themselves in their social
media handles as Figure 5.3 shows some doing. This is why, instead of starting with
ground truth data, I use ground truth data to validate my metadata-based detection
approach.
5.2.1 What We Know About Government Astroturfers
Documents about tactics, job responsibilities and institutional structures can be
readily found on the websites of various bureaucracies, and party instruction manuals
and textbooks are widely available for purchase in Chinese bookstores. These doc-
umentary sources, first used in Miller (2016) provide useful information about the
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process of government astroturfing in China.
Though bureaucracies and government organs such as the Central Propaganda
Department, the Cyberspace Administration of China, and its parent organization,
the Central Leading Small Group for Internet Security and Informatization are noto-
riously secretive, the process of government commentating is actually not very sen-
sitive. Government commentating is routinely and openly discussed at all levels of
government and in the press (Zhang , 2011; Global Times Editorial Team, 2016), and
has even been addressed, though indirectly, by President Xi Jinping (Huang and
Zhai , 2013; Xinhua, 2016). Public acknowledgement, such as the Henan Public Se-
curity Bureau’s press release boasting about hiring 100 government astroturfers, is
quite common.5 Moreover, it is not uncommon for Chinese netizens to support and
condone this practice. The Chinese Government frames this practice as a means to
combat hostile Western forces, protect Internet sovereignty, and guide public opinion.
Commentating teams exist throughout the vast web of Chinese bureaucracies.6
Core commentating teams, when needed, can draw on individuals serving under other
bureaucratic functions to aid in an urgent or more intensive campaign. Astroturfers
usually are a part of public opinion monitoring divisions, and exist alongside struc-
tures responsible for surveillance. When public opinion analysts uncover a potential
threat, commentating teams are directed to implement detailed contingency plans,
responding with a carefully crafted and unified message to the specific public opinion
event (Zou and Su, 2015).
After a close reading of government documents, manuals, and textbooks for inter-
net commentators and public opinion monitors, I outline several common behavioral
patterns of astroturfers that one would not expect to see from ordinary users. To en-
sure that the patterns described in manuals reflect what we see in practice, I compare
5See the press release (in Chinese): http://goo.gl/rgz4xn
6Agricultural bureaucracies, tourism bureaus, propaganda departments, information offices, po-
lice departments, public security bureaus, prisons, and Communist Youth League organizations all
have their own commentating teams, usually in core teams of two or more individuals.
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the content of manuals to a leaked email archive from the Zhanggong Propaganda De-
partment and confirm that these patterns are a good measure of astruturfer behavior
in practice. These leaked emails include spreadsheets, screenshots, word documents,
and text files of astroturfer comments that are reported to managers during district
astroturfer campaigns. These data were very messy and required manual and auto-
mated methods to process and clean. These data are quite biased, and are likely not
representative of how astroturfing works nationally. Zhanggong is not representative
of China. It is a district in the small, prefecture-level city of Ganzhou, a relatively
poor city. This ground truth dataset contains approximately 40,000 astroturfer com-
ments from 8 distinct astroturfing campaigns, many of which are local PR campaigns
that are not nationally salient. The media sources targeted by commentators are
often local or esoteric. Though these data are biased, and can only tell us so much
about the process of astroturfing ouside of Zhanggong, it allows for empirical valida-
tion of government astroturfer behavior identified in documentary sources and later
used to build astroturfer detection models.
These text sources suggest that there are no specific bureaucracies tasked with
commentating. Instead, I find examples of commentating teams in almost every con-
ceivable bureaucracy. These documents also seem to contradict common understand-
ing that this practice is done in people’s spare time, and that they are paid piecemeal.
Instead, the documents suggest that nearly all astroturfers are office workers. Addi-
tionally, though the practice is not uniform across bureaucracies, certain regularities
appear in more developed bureaucracies. For example, astroturfers are often aided by
sophisticated monitoring software developed by private companies (Goonie) or state
media outlets (People’s Daily’s Media Opinion Monitoring Office). I have identified
over 100 such opinion management services operating in mainland China. Bo Mai
confirms this trend in his work on sub-national governments’ budgets for surveillance
technology in China (Mai , 2016). Astroturfers are often full-time workers with spe-
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cific titles such as “news spokesperson (新闻发言人),” “internet commentator, (网
络评论员)” “public opinion analyst (舆论分析员),” etc. Though these job titles are
common, it does not mean that every government astroturfer works full time. Some
are called upon only during crises, and when they are not needed, they return to their
primary responsibilities. During crises, organizations such as the Communist Youth
League encourage members to volunteer as astroturfers. For example, the Guizhou
Province’s Communist Youth League’s guidelines for astroturfer teams stresses the
need to “establish a quick mobilization system: Be able to mobilize 20% of members in
3 hours, 50% of members in 24 hours and 80% of members in 72 hours” (Anonymous ,
2014).
Because Propaganda Department leaks from a single level of government are not
generalizable to the practice of astroturfing throughout China’s vast bureaucracy, I
refrain from using data from available leaks (except for final validation of classifica-
tion models), and build a model based upon common astroturfer behaviors that are
recorded in comment metadata. The behavioral patterns I use are parsimonious and
consistent with nearly all official descriptions of government commentating work as
reflected in aforementioned documents.
5.2.2 Labeling Observations
I label comments (government or non-government) using common behavioral pat-
terns and job responsibilities of government astroturfers, as inferred from documents
and records available on the practice throughout China. In crafting these rules, the
goal was to use modal behaviors of government astroturfers so as to capture the
many diverse practices of commentating across different bureaucracies and govern-
ment ranks. When combined together, these rules make it extremely unlikely that a
non-government comment would be misclassified as a government comment.
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5.2.3 What are the Defining Attributes of Government Astroturfer Be-
havior?
Figure 5.1: Types of Online Commentary
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Based on how the process of commentating is described in government documents,
I create a typology of online commentary to describe how I separate real user com-
mentary from government astroturfer commentary (see Figure 5.1). I start with two
dimensions of online speech that are most discriminating between the behaviors of
ordinary internet users and government astroturfers: 1) the level of organization of
posting behavior, and 2) the alignment of content to state interests. Using this ty-
pology, we can define astroturfing commentary as content that is aligned to state
interests and is produced in a systematic, institutionalized way. A more detailed
explanation of this typology can be found in the appendix.
5.2.4 Rules for Automatically Labeling Comments
With the key dimensions that discriminate between normal and astroturfer com-
mentary in mind, I outline the rules I use to search for government astroturfer com-
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ments. For each rule, I discuss 1) the typological classes into which the rule separates
comments, 2) documentary evidence from central government manuals and local gov-
ernment documents that confirm behaviors or working procedures targeted by the
rule, and 3) empirical evidence of the rule’s discriminating potential using leaked gov-
ernment astroturfer posts from the Zhanggong Propaganda Department to measure
government astroturfer behavior, and both my database of commentary and a ran-
dom sample of Weibo posts as a baseline for normal user posts. The procedure below
will automatically label posts for a training set that will be used to predict comments
in the database that lack complete metadata. These rules will select a subset of all
comments belonging to government astroturfers that will be used to train a classifier.
This classifier will provide an estimate of the proportion of government astroturfers in
news comment sections online, the topic distribution of astroturfer-targeted content,
and the bureaucratic affiliation of government astroturfers.
1. There are two or more users posting from the comment’s IP address
Typological Classes: As described in the previous section, government astro-
turfers work in office environments at a wide variety of bureaucracies. Employ-
ees using the same router, as is common in office situations, almost always share
the same IP address. Government astroturfers, because they are more “institu-
tional” than “individual” should then be observed at IP addresses with posts
made by several users.7 Documentary Evidence: In the corpus of public and
leaked government documents, nearly all documents that included employee
rosters either listed several employees with the title “internet commentator”
or listed several employees whose responsibilities include monitoring and guid-
ing opinion. It is clear based on evidence from the leaked email archive and
these documents that government commentating is almost always done in team
7This will be true unless employees share a single account. This would defeat the purpose of
comment astroturfing because the entire point of astroturfing is to create the appearance of mass
support or unity in opinion.
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settings. Moreover, official party cadre manuals, textbooks, bureaucratic job
descriptions, and employee responsibility documents indicate that bureaucrats
working full-time in other functions are mobilized as needed to comment along-
side the core full-time public opinion monitoring and commentating employees.
For particularly urgent “public opinion emergencies,” this trend will be even
more pronounced. This practice is described in detail in several manuals and
textbooks on Internet commentating (Zou and Su, 2015; Gao and Zhang , 2011).
Empirical Evidence: The emails from the Zhanggong Propaganda Department
leak confirm this behavior. There are 233 Weibo accounts listed in URL form
in the leak, and there are several news stories and events identified in the leak
that astroturfers targeted simultaneously from different accounts. Of the com-
mentating reports to management that include user information, nearly all of
them include posts made by several users at the same work unit (单位). Among
these documents, there is an average of 11 separate users working on the same
commentating task. Additionally, there is ample evidence that individual as-
troturfers make use of several accounts, posting from them at the same time to
increase the appearance of “grassroots” support (Ai , 2012). In the Zhanggong
leak, several documents confirm this trend, with some users utilizing as many
as 50 different accounts at the same time.
2. There is an unusual volume of posts attributed to the IP address
(more than 20 posts)
Typological Classes: This rule helps discriminate between “institutional” and
“individual” accounts, and is particularly helpful at screening out public WiFi
networks that may have a high number of usernames associated with an IP
address, but do not have a large volume of posts that would be characteristic
of a large commentating campaign. Documentary Evidence: In rosters of em-
ployees, most government offices with astroturfer teams usually have at least
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2 employees working full time on public opinion management. Because of this
trend, for government IP addresses, there are likely more posts per IP address
than an ordinary internet user who chooses to participate in article discussion
threads. Moreover, government astroturfers are often encouraged and evaluated
based on the number of posts they make (CCP , 2013), often receiving a certain
number of points per post. Empirical Evidence: In the Zhanggong Propaganda
Department leak, email reports to management detailing commentating work
have an average of approximately 30 posts. In the leak, there is also evidence of
users posting several thousand comments during a “public opinion emergency.”
In contrast, the average number of posts per IP address in my entire dataset,
which can be seen as a baseline for normal commenting behavior is 1.85. I
set the threshold at 20 posts, an approximate lower bound for the number of
comments reported for campaigns in the Zhanggong leak.
3. Posts belonging to the IP address are sentence-length (post length,
in characters are on average > 20).
Typological Classes: This rule helps discriminate between “institutional” and
“individual” accounts, capturing the more conscientious behavior of commenta-
tors and filtering out more ad-hoc, unvarnished posts of ordinary commentators.
Documentary Evidence: In government documents a great deal of attention is
paid to the quality of posts made by government astroturfers. Documents that
outline government astroturfer job responsibilities usually require ideological
purity and sophistication of post content. Additionally, astroturfers are con-
sistently required to be well-informed on relevant issues. All messages are to
conform to the instructions given by managers, and are reported back in emails.
These requirements make it less likely that a post coming from a government
astroturfer will be short. Government astroturfers in many circumstances are
required to make posts that are longer than a certain number of characters
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(CCP , 2013). Empirical Evidence: In the leaked Zhanggong archive, the aver-
age post length was around 30 characters, and most are complete sentences. To
ensure most comments from a user are written in complete sentences, I set the
threshold to an average of 20 characters.
4. Weibo accounts associated with this IP address follow or are followed
by at least one government account.
Typological Classes: This class separates commentary that is “aligned” with
government interests from commentary that is “neutral” or “opposed” to gov-
ernment interests. Documentary Evidence: Government offices in my database
of government documents frequently seek to gain large numbers of followers,
as this is an important metric of local government performance (Peoples Daily
Weibo Data Center , 2015). Moreover, managers also may follow individuals
so as to supervise their work. Empirical Evidence: Because astroturfers work
in office environments, management often requests that employees follow the
Weibo account of their work unit or other relevant office(s). This is evident
in the Zhanggong Propaganda Department leak, which includes several spread-
sheets of employees accounting for which of them have followed government
accounts as required. Because there are over 200,000 Weibo accounts to clas-
sify, I built a classifier to automatically determine whether Weibo accounts are
government or non-government accounts using a subset of labeled data. The
practice of government astroturfers following and being followed by government
accounts is empirically observable in the leaked Zhanggong Propaganda depart-
ment emails. According to the decisions of the government Weibo classifier
(described in detail below) of the 233 accounts belonging to government astro-
turfers in the leaked Zhanggong Propaganda Department dataset 127 (54%) of
them follow, or are followed by government Weibo accounts. As a baseline for
normal behavior, I drew a random sample of Weibo accounts (Fu and Chau,
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2013) and found that in contrast, only 10% of them follow or are followed by
government accounts.
***
If all of these rules are jointly satisfied, it is highly unlikely that government doc-
uments returned by the search would not come from government sources. Predictive
accuracy of models trained on this subset of comments (94.1% accuracy in predicting
Zhanggong Propaganda Department comments) adds supportive evidence that each
of these rules is discriminating between ordinary comments and comments from gov-
ernment astroturfers. The resulting set of predicted government comments nearly all
appear to have a clear pro-government agenda.
5.3 Government Weibo Account Classifier
Figure 5.2:
Profile Pictures from a Random Sample of Predicted Government Weibo
Accounts
The most difficult part of building the training set mentioned in the previous
section was identifying government Weibo accounts in a astroturfer’s social networks
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(rule 4). A sizable subset of comments in the dataset (roughly 4 million) contained
links to the authoring user’s Weibo account. This is because in order to comment
on Sina News, one must sign in with their Sina account, which is also used for the
Weibo microblogging platform. In order to determine whether rule 4 of the labeling
process is satisfied (that at least one of the IP address’s users follows or is followed
by a government account), I needed to determine if each Weibo account in each
user’s social network is a government account, i.e. an account that is the official
Weibo account of a government bureaucracy or government organ, or an account of
an idividual who identifies as a manager or leader within a bureaucracy or government
organ. State-owned enterprises are excluded. To find these accounts, I construct a
support vector machine (SVM) classifier8 trained on manually labeled Weibo accounts
with class labels:
C(xi) =

1 xi is a government account,
0 otherwise.
5.3.1 Features
The following features are extracted from Weibo account data and are transformed
to a data matrix used to fit the classifier.
1. Text from username and short description
(a) Tf-idf weighted unigram and bigram counts
(b) Counts: Punctuation, Emoji, latin characters, city names, province names
(c) Count of government words: A list of words most often associated with
government agencies.
(d) Count of non-government words: A list of words that would not likely
be associated with government accounts (such as “celebrity,” “athlete,”
“NBA,” “TV program,” “newspaper,” etc).
(e) Character length
2. Verified account or company account (binary)
8Because classification models of text often have high-dimensional feature-space, they are well-
suited to the support vector machine (SVM) classifier. High dimensional spaces are more likely to be
approximately linearly separable, a necessary condition for a linear SVM to work (Joachims, 1998).
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3. Number of followers, following, posts (count, normalized)
5.3.2 Labeling Government Accounts
To begin the labeling process, I labeled a random sample of 3000 Weibo accounts
that were following or followed by likely government astroturfers in a subset of com-
ments meeting the requirements of rules 1, 2 and 4 in section 5.2.4.9 After the initial
sample was labeled, the remainder of Weibo accounts were labeled in batches of 100
using active learning until 10,000 accounts were labeled. Each batch comprised the 50
accounts with the shortest euclidean distance from each side of the class-separating
hyperplane. Distance to the class-separating hyperplane measures uncertainty, as the
SVM algorithm attempts to find the hyperplane that maximizes the margin between
observations from each class. This means that the points closest to the hyperplane
are the most likely points to be misclassified by the SVM. This iterative labeling
process reduces the amount of labeled data needed to achieve a high performing clas-
sifier (Brinker , 2003; Liu, 2004; Schohn and Cohn, 2000; Tong and Koller , 2002).
This process also can be useful for classification problems with class imbalances as
labeling enough positive observations (government accounts) is difficult given their
relative scarcity in the population. It also facilitates an automatic way of discovering
concepts that seem obvious to a human but are actually quite difficult for a computer
to differentiate.10 See the algorithm for this labeling procedure in the appendix.
9Identifying social network connections on Weibo took a great deal of computational resources
and time as there is no way of using the official Weibo API to obtain network connections. Instead,
I had to use a headless browser to manually crawl each account, a process that took several weeks.
10For example, the classifier had trouble with hospital Weibo accounts, as most of these accounts
include a city, and are organized by divisions and bureaus like government agencies. After one round
of active learning which included several hospital accounts, the classifier was able to correctly classify
these accounts.
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Table 5.1: Results on Held-out Development Set
Class Precision Recall F1 Support
Non-Govt 0.98 0.92 0.95 903
Govt 0.83 0.96 0.89 381
Avg./Total 0.94 0.93 0.93 1284
5.3.3 Performance of Government Weibo Classifier
I fit a linear support vector machine (SVM) on labeled data using the features
described in the previous section. I employed randomized hyperparameter search and
5-fold cross validation to choose an optimal set of parameters from predefined con-
tinuous and discrete distributions of parameter values (Bergstra and Bengio, 2012).
I used the hyperparameter set achieving the highest cross-validated F-measure score
on the held-out development set. Table 5.1 shows the performance of the final model
using precision, recall, and F1 metrics.11
Table 5.2: Counts and Proportions of Government Accounts
Type Count %
Domestic Security 2057 43.79
Propaganda Organs 1211 25.78
Courts, Local Govts., Procuratorates 483 10.28
Communist Youth Leagues 257 5.47
Economic Development 151 3.21
Other 538 11.45
The following is a rough measure of the types of government connections (followers and following) of government
astroturfers.
11 Precision measures how accurate the guesses of the relevant class are. Recall measures how
many of the relevant class were recalled. F1 is the harmonic mean of precision and recall. F1 is
useful for hyperparameter tuning and is often chosen as the metric used to tune hyperparameters in
grid search, randomized search, or Bayesian optimization of hyperparameters (Snoek et al., 2012).
Precision =
true positive
true positive + false positive
Recall =
true positive
true positive + false negative
F-Measure = 2· precision · recall
precision + recall
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5.3.4 Network Structure and Inferring the Bureaucratic Affiliation of As-
troturfers
The training set identified using rules in section 5.2.4 has network structures one
would expect from documentary evidence describing the organization of these teams.
It appears that government commentators cluster around Weibo accounts of similar
region and bureaucratic type. This is consistent with government documents and
manuals that suggest decentralization and specialization of commentating and opin-
ion guidance work (Miller , 2016). As discussed in previous sections, government
astroturfers are often connected to the social media accounts of affiliated bureaucra-
cies. This means that astroturfers’ social media data can be used to infer a astro-
turfer’s bureaucratic affiliation. Though these guesses are crude, they confirm what
is apparent in government documents and manuals, that the practice of government
commentating is common across a wide range of bureaucracies in China.
Network graphs for propaganda organs can be seen in Figure 5.3, and network
graphs for public security organs can be seen in Figure 5.4. Color nodes represent
government accounts that are followed by at least one government astroturfer. Gray
nodes represent government astroturfers. Several commentators in these figures even
include their official title of “Internet Commentator” in their Weibo account bio. All
government accounts are hand labeled according to bureaucracy type. A frequency
table of government accounts by type can be seen in Table 5.2. A plurality of gov-
ernment astroturfers are part of China’s burgeoning domestic security apparatus12
Notably, propaganda departments do not make up the bulk of commentary, as is
widely assumed to be true.
12In 2011, China’s spending on domestic security outstripped it’s military spending, and has
continued to grow significantly year-on-year (Buckley , 2011).
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Figure 5.3: Network Structure of Predicted Propaganda Accounts
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Figure 5.4: Network Structure of Predicted Domestic Security Accounts
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5.4 Government Astroturfer Classifier
With the training data discovered using the metadata search process outlined
above, I trained a classifier to identify additional comments that could not be identi-
fied using the search procedure due to insufficient metadata. For the negative class,
I randomly sampled an equal number of comments from the pool of comments one
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would expect from an ordinary/civilian astroturfer, that is, posts where there is only
one username associated with an IP address, and less than 5 comments per IP ad-
dress. This made up the “non-government” class of comments. Once I fit classifiers
on this training data, I could use them to retrieve probable astroturfer comments
that were not identified using the search procedure due to missing metadata. I then
validated classifiers on a sample of government astroturfer posts from the leaked
Zhanggong Propaganda Department emails, showing that each classifier is predictive
of ground-truth astroturfer comments.
5.4.1 Text Features
Below are the text features used in my classification model. To prevent overfitting
and favor model sparsity, a subset of features are automatically discarded using the
coefficients of a linear SVM with `1 norm penalty. Features with coefficient values
lower than the mean of all coefficients are discarded (Rakotomamonjy , 2003).
Text classification using Chinese text requires an additional step due to the Chi-
nese writing system’s lack of spaces delineating the beginning and end of a word.
Before using a word features, it is necessary to segment text. For this I use a hidden
Markov model (HMM) to segment Chinese text.13 After segmentation, stopwords14
are removed.15
A full overview of features, including several custom features that proved discrim-
inating are listed here:
1. Tf-idf16 weighted unigram and bigram counts
2. Count of province names
13For this, I use jieba, a Python tool for Chinese text parsing: https://github.com/fxsjy/jieba
14Stopwords are words that carry little information (the, and, so, etc.)
15I use a stopword list that is a slightly modified version of the list used by Baidu, China’s Google,
for its natural language modeling.
16tf-idf stands for “term frequency inverse document frequency.” The term frequency tf is the
count of how many times a word appears in a document divided by the number of words in the
document, the inverse document frequency idf measures how often a term occurs across all docu-
ments and is measured by log( total document countcount of documents containing word ), and the tf-idf weight is their product
(tf · idf) (Lan et al., 2005)
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3. Count of country names
4. Count of city names
5. Count of punctuation
6. Emoji count
7. Text length (in characters)
Table 5.3: Results on Held-out Development Set
Algorithm Acc. Avg. Prec. Avg. Rec. Avg. F1 ZG Acc. P(GC) P(GC) s.e.
SVM 0.6764 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.9050 0.1582 0.000072
LR 0.6779 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.9144 0.1710 0.000095
SVM, LR 0.6821 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.9413 0.1453 0.000353
5.4.2 Performance of Classifiers
Using the feature matrix outlined above, I fit several different classification algo-
rithms to the training set consisting of observations that meet all the behavioral rules
outlined in section 5.2.4.
As I did with the government Weibo classifier, I used 5-fold cross-validation and
randomized hyperparameter search to select each model’s parameters, optimizing for
F-measure from predictions on held-out data (as explained above). After I tried
a handful of classification algorithms and ensembles, I chose the 3 best performing
models according to the average F1 score for both classes: a support vector machine
(SVM), a logistic regression classifier (LR), and a majority vote ensemble classifier
comprised of a SVM classifier and a logistic regression classifier. The performance of
each model is well above the .5 baseline for binary classification problems and achieves
an accuracy of .9 or above on the leaked Zhanggong comments.
5.4.3 Estimated Percent of Government Astroturfers in News Comment
Sections
After fitting several classifiers to training data, I used them to predict the propor-
tion of astroturfing commentary in the entire dataset. I use parametric bootstrap,
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drawing 1000 random samples of n = 25000 to estimate the proportion of government
comments. The raw proportion
n∑
i
cˆi
n
is biased because misclassification error is not
uniform across classes. To adjust for this bias, we must estimate the proportion of
government comments using the following equation, where cˆ = 1 if the model predicts
the government comment class, and cˆ = 0 if the model predicts the non-government
comment class:
P (ci = 1) =
P (cˆi = 1)− (1− recall0)
recall1 − (1− recall0) ; recallc =
true positivec
true positivec + false negativec
This estimator is unbiased so long as the performance metrics estimated with
the training set “also hold in the unlabeled population set” (Levy and KASS , 1970;
Hopkins and King , 2010). Though I do not assume a distribution for the estimates of
P (ci = 1), the standard errors of the estimates in Table 5.3 assume normality, which
appears reasonable as all distributions of resampled estimates appear unimodal and
normal.
Based on the proportion estimates in Table 5.3, government comments appear
to make up between 14.5%-17.3% of all commentary in the comment sections of the
sample of news sources represented in my dataset.
Conclusion
I outline a method for retrieval of government astroturfers using non-text meta-
data. Based on careful and broad reading of government documents on the practice,
I create rules to automatically label a training set, each of which is validated using
ground truth data from the Zhanggong Propaganda Department emails. Using ad-
justed proportions from several different classifiers, run on two datasets, I show that
between 14.5%-17.1% of all commentary represented in my dataset (approximately
6.75 million comments) come from government astroturfers. All classifiers predict
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leaked propaganda data with at least 90% accuracy.
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APPENDIX A
A.1 Chapter 4
A.1.1 Intercoder Reliability
These are the results comparing the predictive power of coder 1 to coder 2’s
decisions using the area under the receiver operator curve (ROC AUC). ROC AUC is
a better measure than raw accuracy because it is not misleading in situations where
there are class imbalances. Nearly all categories are above the acceptable measure of
.7 and most are above .85, which is highly reliable.
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Table A.1: Intercoder Reliability Measures
Category AUC Category AUC Category AUC
Col. Action 0.89 Government 0.82 Reoccurring Political Event 0.85
Social Groups 0.87 Central Government 0.78 Sensitive Anniversary 0.89
Petitions 0.8 State-Owned Enterprise 0.63 Regular Political Event 0.67
Protest 0.86 Government Policy 0.72 Sexuality 0.82
Social Activism 0.85 Political Humor 0.96 Pornography 0.51
Strikes 1 Government Leadership 0.92 Sina 0.94
Commercial 0.81 Local Government 0.73 Sina Censorship 0.98
Sina’s Competitors 0.51 Party Ideology 0.83 Sina Company Business 0.93
Corruption 0.93 Leadership Personal Infor-
mation
0.7 Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau 0.98
Central Govt. Corruption 0.91 Xi Jinping 0.98 Hong Kong, Macau 0.99
Local Govt. Corruption 0.84 Government Criticism 0.7 Taiwan 0.99
Crime 0.81 Censorship Policy 0.58 Ethnicity 0.98
Financial Crime 0.89 Power Struggle 0.59 Tibetan 0.94
Political Crime 0.86 Nationalism 0.79 Uighur 0.96
Violent Crime 0.84 Party History 0.67 Other Ethnic Minority 0.94
Illegal Goods/Services 0.89 Military 0.78 Entertainment 0.73
Disaster 0.91 Territorial Disputes 0.94 Terrorism 0.99
Man-made Disaster 0.9 Rumors 0.91
Natural Disaster 0.76 Non-political Rumors 0.98
Foreign Media 0.81 Political Rumors 0.88
A.1.2 Coding Diagrams
The coding diagrams below were used by research assistants during coding. Blue
boxes represent secondary topic categories. Abbreviations for topic categories can be
found in Table A.2. A text version of the coding scheme is included below each flow
chart.
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Table A.2: Abbreviation Mapping
Abbreviation Category Name Abbreviation Category Name
COL PE Petition GOV CP Censorship Policy
COL PR Protest GOV CR Criticism
COL SA Social Activism GOV GP Government Policy
COL SG Social Groups GOV HU Humor, Satire
COL ST Strike/Labor Disputes GOV LE Government Leadership
COM CM Competitors GOV LO Local/Subnational Government
COR CE Central/National Government GOV PA Party Ideology
COR LO Local/Subnational Government GOV PE Personal Information
CRI CC Cyber Crime GOV PS Power Struggle
CRI FI Financial Crime GOV XI Xi Jinping
CRI GM Gambling HKT HK Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan
CRI IG Illicit Goods and Services HKT TW Taiwan
CRI PO Police NAT HI History
CRI VI Violent Crime NAT MI Military
DIS MA Man-made Disaster NAT TE Territorial disputes
DIS NA Natural Disaster RUM NO Non-political Rumors
ENT Entertainment RUM POL Political Rumor
ETH OT Other Ethnic Group SEN AN Anniversary
ETH TI Tibetan SEN GO Government Business
ETH UI Uighur SEX LG LGBT
FOR FOR Foreign Media SEX POR Pornography
GOV CE Central/National Government SEX SE Sexually Suggestive Content
GOV CO State-Owned Enterprise TER Terrorism
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Figure A.1: Collective Action Coding Diagram
COLLECTIVE ACTION
Does the text mention or 
imply an event where a 
group of people took 
action together to achieve 
a common objective?
NO
Does the text mention or 
imply an individual or group 
of individuals who are 
advocating on behalf of a 
social, religious, or ethnic 
group?
YES YES
Does the content mention or imply a street 
protest or march?
COL
PR
Does the content mention or imply a labor 
conflict or strike?
Does the content mention or imply an in-person 
petition (信访), online petition (请愿书), citizen 
denunciation/reporting (举报) 
corruption/problems to government 
bureaucracies/officials, solicitation of retweets or 
signatures,  traveling to a government location to 
petition government about a grievance.
COL
ST
COL
PE
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
Does the content mention or imply social or 
religious groups such as labor unions, NGOs, 
Falun Gong, house churches, Muslim 
association, etc.
COL
SG
Does the content mention or imply advocacy on 
behalf of a social group? Examples would 
include advocacy related to women’s rights, gay 
rights, legal rights, rights for prostitutes, human 
rights protection. Content either mentions a 
group directly, or relates to a member of a social 
group such as Chen Guangcheng.
COL
SA
YES
YES
YES YES
The content either 1) mentions or implies an event where a group of people took action together to
achieve a common objective, or 2) mentions or implies an individual or group of individuals who are
advocating on behalf of a social, religious, or ethnic group.
Figure A.2: Commercial Coding Diagram
COMMERCIAL
Does the text mention or 
imply a business or 
company? 
YES
NO
Is that company Sina?
NO
YES
Is the company a 
state-owned enterprise 
(SOE) such as 新华、中国石
化, 国家电网公司, 中国工商银
行, 中国建设银行, 中国农业银
行, 中国移动?
 
YES
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
SIN
Is the company one of Sina’s 
competitors such as 
Tencent?
YES
COM
CM
The text mentions or implies a business or company that is not Sina and is not a state-owned
enterprise (SOE).
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Figure A.3: Corruption Coding Diagram
CORRUPTION
Does the content mention or 
imply misuse of government 
office, government funds?
YES
NO Does the content mention or 
imply sexual misconduct of 
government officials?
YES CRI
YES
YES CRI
NO
NO
Does the content mention or 
imply that a government 
official or his/her family 
financially benefited from a 
government post?
YES
YES CRI
NO
Does the content mention or 
imply the involvement of 
national/central government 
agencies, bureaucracies or 
leaders?
YES
COR
LO
NO
COR
CE
The content mentions or implies any of the following: 1) misuse of local government office or local
government funds, 2) sexual misconduct of local government officials 3) a local government official
and/or his/her family financially benefiting from a government post.
Figure A.4: Crime Coding Diagram
CRIME
Does the content mention or imply violent crime 
such as assault, rape, murder?
NO
Does the content describe or 
imply a violation of Chinese 
law?
Does the content mention or 
imply Chinese law 
enforcement or criminal 
justice functions such as: 
police, courts, judges, prison 
employees, chengguan, 
indictments, investigations, 
allegations, warrants, etc.
YES
YES
NO
NO
Does the content mention or 
imply police?
YES
CRI
PO
CRI
VI
Does the content mention or imply gambling?CRIGA
Does the content mention or imply cyber crime 
such as hacking, piracy, etc.?
CRI
CC
Does content mention or imply financial crime 
such as  fraud, bribery, embezzlement, etc.?
CRI
FI
Does the content mention or imply the sale, trafficking, or trading of illicit goods such as drugs, guns, 
pirated movies, etc. or illicit services such as prostitution, essay writing services, forged documents, etc.?
CRI
IG
Does the content mention or imply political 
corruption?COR
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
The content mentions or implies either 1) a violation of Chinese law, 2) Chinese law enforcement or
criminal justice functions such as: police, courts, judges, prison employees, chengguan, indictments,
investigations, allegations, warrants, etc.
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Figure A.5: Disaster Coding Diagram
DISASTER
Does the text mention or 
imply one of the following:
terrorist attack, pollution, 
chemical explosion, 
earthquake, fire, flood, major 
storm, epidemic?
YES
NO Does the text mention or 
imply an event where more 
than one person hurt or 
injured?
YES
NO Does the text mention or imply an event where 
property was destroyed or 
damaged on a large scale?
YES
NODoes the text mention or imply an event where more 
than one person hurt or 
injured?
Was human action, inaction, 
or incompetence responsible 
for the disaster itself or the 
severity of the disaster’s 
outcome?
NO YES
NO
DIS
NA
YES YES YES
DIS
MA
The content mentions or implies one of the following: 1) an event where more than one person
hurt or injured, 2) an event where property was destroyed or damaged on a large scale, 3) any of
the following: terrorist attack, pollution, chemical explosion, earthquake, fire, flood, major storm,
epidemic.
Figure A.6: Entertainment Coding Diagram
ENTERTAINMENT
Does the content mention or 
imply a Chinese entertainer 
such as 郭美美、范冰冰、谢
娜、何炅、AngelaBaby, a 
public intellectual or blogger 
such as 柴静、周小平、方舟
子、韩寒 or a public figure 
such as 释永信?
YES
NO
Does the content mention or 
imply a product of Chinese 
popular culture such as 
movies, television, books, 
online novels, brands?
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
The content mentions or implies one of the following: 1) a Chinese entertainer, public intellectual,
blogger, or a public figure, 2) a product of Chinese popular culture such as movies, television, books,
online novels, brands.
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Figure A.7: Ethnicity Coding Diagram
ETHNICITY
Does the content mention or 
imply an ethnic group or a 
member of an ethnic group 
other than Han?
YES
NO Does the content mention or 
imply an autonomous 
region?
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
Does the content mention or imply Tibetan 
individuals or the Tibet Autonomous Region?
ETH
TI
Does the content mention or imply Uighur 
individuals or Xinjiang?
ETH
UI
Does the content mention or imply other ethnic 
minorities such as Hui, Mongolian, etc.?
ETH
OT
YES
YES
YES
The content mentions or implies one of the following: 1) an ethnic group or a member of an ethnic
group other than Han, 2) an autonomous region in China.
Figure A.8: Foreign Media Coding Diagram
FOREIGN MEDIA
Does the content mention a 
foreign media outlet or a 
media outlet from Taiwan or 
Hong Kong? Ex. Epoch 
Times, 苹果日报, New York 
Times, etc.
YES
NO
Does the content include an 
article title or article link that 
when found through online 
search is from a foreign 
media outlet or a media 
outlet from Taiwan or Hong 
Kong?
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
The content mentions a foreign media outlet or a media outlet from Taiwan or Hong Kong. This
includes content with an article title or article link that when searched is from a foreign media outlet
or a media outlet from Taiwan or Hong Kong.
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Figure A.9: Government Coding Diagram
GOVERNMENTDoes the content mention or imply a 
Chinese government institution,  
organization, or bureaucracy?
Ex: 市政府、中级人民法院、工商总局、
计生委、全国人大、政治局、中央 军委、
国务院
YES
Does the content mention or imply 
Chinese government policy?
Does the content mention or imply a 
Chinese government official of any rank 
or position, their family members, or 
their partners/mistresses?
YESYES
YES
Does the content mention or imply the involvement of national/central government agencies, bureaucracies or leaders?GOVCE
Does the content speak ill of, criticize, or ridicule government leaders or their families, government policies, or government institutions? 
Do instructions mention “negative” content or content that “attacks” or “mocks?”
GOV
CR
YES
YES
Does the content involve mockery, humor, or satire?GOVHU
YES
NO
Does the content mention or imply a 
Chinese state-owned enterprise 
(SOE)?
Ex: 新华、中国石化 , 国家电网公司 , 中
国工商银行, 中国建设银行, 中国农业银
行, 中国移动?
YES
YES GOVCO
GOV
CE
Does the content mention or imply Xi Jinping or his relatives?GOVXI
YES
YES GOVLE
YES GOVGP
Does the content mention or imply government censorship policy?GOVCP
Does the content mention or imply personal information of  government officials and their families, such as assets, 
finances,relationships, health, etc.?
GOV
PE
YES
Does the content mention competition over government posts, speculation about promotion, or conflicts between officials. GOVPS
YES
Does the content mention political ideology, such as Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong thought, Deng Xiaoping theory, etc; or 2) political 
slogans such as “harmonious society,” “three represents,” “four absolutes,” etc.?
GOV
PA
YES
GOV
LE
YES
GOV
CR
GOV
CE
Does the content mention or imply the involvement of sub-national/local government agencies, bureaucracies or leaders?GOVLO
YES
The content mentions or implies a Chinese government institution, organization, or bureau-
cracy, a Chinese government official of any rank or position, their family members or their part-
ners/mistresses, a Chinese government policy, or a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE).
Figure A.10: Hong Kong/Taiwan Coding Diagram
HONG KONG/MACAU/TAIWAN
Does the content mention or 
imply the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) 
or people from Hong Kong?
YES
NO Does the content mention or 
imply Taiwan or people from 
Taiwan?
YES HKTHK
YES
YES HKTTW
NO
Does the content mention or 
imply Macau SAR or a SAR 
in general?
YES
YES
NO
NO
The content mentions or implies any of the following: 1) the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (SAR) or people from Hong Kong, 2) Taiwan or people from Taiwan, 3) Macau SAR, an
SAR in general, or people from an SAR.
111
Figure A.11: Nationalism Coding Diagram
Does the content mention a Chinese 
CCP (except Taiwanese) 
revolutionary leader such as Mao 
Zedong, Zhou Enlai, etc., or 
foundational historical events related 
to the Party/China such as the Long 
March, Anti-Japanese war, national 
humiliation (国耻), etc.?
NO
NATIONALISM
Does the content reference or imply 
territorial disputes such as Taiwan, 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, South 
China Sea, etc.?
NO Does the content
 mention or imply disputes with rival 
countries such as the United States, 
Japan, South Korea, etc.?
Does the content reference the 
military?
YES
YES
NO
YESYES
YES
YES
Does the content mention or imply 
celebration or pride in China, the 
Chinese people such as National 
Day, the Olympics, etc.?
YES
YES
NO
Does the content mention symbols, or 
monuments to the Chinese nation, 
such as the Chinese flag, Tiananmen 
Square, war memorials, the Great Hall 
of the People, etc.
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NAT
MI YES
NAT
TE YES
NAT
HI
The content references or implies any of the following: 1) territorial disputes such as Taiwan,
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, South China Sea, etc., 2) a Chinese CCP (except Taiwanese) revolution-
ary leader such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, etc., or foundational historical events related to the
Party/China such as the Long March, Anti-Japanese war, national humiliation (国耻), etc., 3) a
Chinese CCP (except Taiwanese) revolutionary leader such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, etc., or
foundational historical events related to the Party/China such as the Long March, Anti-Japanese
war, national humiliation (国耻), etc., 4) celebration or pride in China, the Chinese people such as
National Day, the Olympics, etc., 5) disputes with rival countries such as the United States, Japan,
South Korea, etc.
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Figure A.12: Rumors Coding Diagram
RUMORS
Does the content 
EXPLICITLY mention that 
the content is one of the 
following: a rumor, fake 
news, not true, 
photoshopped?
YES
YES
NO
Is the rumor about politics, 
political leadership, 
government policy, etc.?
YES
NO
RUM
PO
RUM
NO
NO
The content EXPLICITLY mentions that the content is one of the following: a rumor, fake news,
not true, photoshopped.
Figure A.13: Sensitive Anniversary Coding Diagram
POLITICAL ANNIVERSARY
Does the content mention or 
imply a politically sensitive 
historical anniversary such 
as 六四／天安门、温州动车周
年、五四?
YES
NO
Does the content mention or 
imply a regular political 
event such as: 十八大、
两会、北戴河会议、政协会议、
三中全会、四中全会、等
YES SENAN
YES
YES SENGO
NO
NO
The content mentions or implies any of the following: 1) a politically sensitive historical anniversary
such as June 4 or the Wenzhou train crash, 2) a regular political event such as a party congress, the
two meetings, etc.
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Figure A.14: Sexuality Coding Diagram
SEXUALITY
Does the content mention, depict, or imply 
sex, sexuality, or nudity?
NO
NO
Does the content explicitly mention, depict 
pornography, nudity or sex?
SEX
PO
Does the content imply pornography, nudity or 
sex?
SEX
SE
Does the content mention or imply LGBT 
individuals, issues, policies, etc.?
CRI
LG
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
The content mentions, depicts, or implies sex, sexuality, or nudity.
Figure A.15: Sina Coding Diagram
SINA
Does the content mention or 
imply Sina’s censorship 
policies?
YES
NO
Does the content mention or 
imply discussion of topics 
related to Sina’s corporate 
interests, corporate 
strategies, corporate 
partnerships, or business 
ventures?
YES
NO
NO
YES SINCE YES
SIN
CO
NO
Does the content mention or 
imply general maintenance 
or governance of the Sina 
platform outside of Sina’s 
censorship duties (e.g. 
preventing copyright 
infringement or fixing bugs in 
Sina’s software)?
YES
YES SINCO
The content mentions or implies one of the following: 1) Sina’s censorship policies, 2) discussion of
topics related to Sina’s corporate interests, corporate strategies, corporate partnerships, or business
ventures, 3) general maintenance or governance of the Sina platform outside of Sina’s censorship
duties (e.g. preventing copyright infringement or fixing bugs in Sina’s software)
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Figure A.16: Terrorism Coding Diagram
TERRORISM
Does the text mention or 
imply terrorism, defined as 
“the use of indiscriminate 
violence to create terror/fear 
in order to achieve a political, 
religious or ideological goal?”
YES
NO
YES
NO
The text mentions or implies terrorism, defined as “the use of indiscriminate violence to create
terror/fear in order to achieve a political, religious or ideological goal?”
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A.2 Chapter 5
A.2.1 Data Collection
Figure A.17: Data Collection and Processing Architecture
For each source
(every 10 minutes)
For each source
(every hour)
Scheduler
Source
DOM
Database
Crawler Agent
Threads
look up
Ranked
URL
Database
Crawl Queue
(Local Memory)
Link Extraction and
Relevance Ranking
save Article
Database
look up
Crawler Agent
Threads
Comment
Database
save
Content Extraction
Feature Extraction
(dependencies, named entities, tokens, parts of speech)
Feature
Database
save
read
update
URL requests URL requests
TOR anonymizer TOR anonymizer
I have built software to collect comment and article data at 10 minute intervals
persistently on a dedicated 64-core cluster, gathering approximately 2.5 million new
comments and 75,000 articles every week. Data are collected via requests to news
websites through the TOR network1 which obfuscates the server’s IP address to pre-
vent request throttling. Data have been collected since late 2015, spanning just over a
year’s time. The scraping software targets 19 popular news outlets that vary in their
state-affiliation, level of commercialization, and region. Unless articles and posts are
censored, or are deliberately hidden, I collect the population of articles matching a
site-specific regular expression for news articles from each of these news websites.2
1https://www.torproject.org/
2Article text and metadata along with each article’s comments and related user metadata are
collected using API’s I uncovered hidden in several sites’ software architectures, or slower, less
efficient headless browser scrapers that gather data from the DOM of a website.
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In total, I have collected approximately 6 million articles and 70 million comments.
Text features and data are processed asynchronously. Please see Figure A.17 for a
detailed diagram of data collection and processing architecture.
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A.2.2 Typology of Online Commentary
Along the “organization” dimension, I specify two categories: “institutional” and
“individual.” These categories describe the behavior I observe at each IP address.
An IP address represents a unique local internet network. This can be a wireless
network for a home, office, or coffee shop. At a normal IP address, one would expect
an individual or groups of individuals to behave in certain ways. For example, users
at a coffee shop are likely to visit a wide range of websites and it would be very
unlikely that two individuals at a single coffee shop would comment on the same news
article. One would expect there to be a great degree of variance in the topics of social
media posts and articles upon which individuals from this IP comment. Network
activity such as this indicates a lack of group coordination and an “organization”
level that matches uncoordinated, or “individual” browsing behavior. Conversely,
one might observe an IP address where several users visit the same news article
and post similar content in favor of a government policy, a product, or a church
event. This type of activity seems more characteristic of a PR firm’s office, or a
government bureaucracy. If one observed messages from a single IP address that
were coordinated in this way, one might assume that the level of organization of
comments from this IP address is “institutional.” Along the “alignment” dimension I
specify three categories: “aligned”, “neutral”, and “opposed.” These levels are fairly
straightforward. Commentary that is “aligned” with state interests is political in
nature, and is consistent with the Party’s ideology. Commentary that is “opposed”
to state interests is also political in nature, but criticizes the Party’s policies, or
expresses opinions that are in opposed to the interests of the regime. Naturally,
“neutral” messages are not political in nature, and thus do not lean one way or
another, an example would be news about a basketball game. Categories along this
“Alignment of Content to State Interests” dimension help distinguish if comments
within a single IP address are consistent with messages we would expect to come from
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state actors. This dimension helps us disambiguate regime, corporate and foreign
sources of “institutional” commentary to aid in accurate detection of government
astroturfing with which we can train a text classification model.
“Government astroturfer commentary”, which is represented in the typology by the
cell in the top left, represents pro-regime commentary that comes from regime actors.
I define regime actors as any person employed by a government agency (i.e. bureau-
crats, politicians, government contractors). The motivation of this commentary is
either to “guide opinion” in the direction of state interests, signal regime strength, or
organize the the masses (i.e. the “mass line”3).
“Corporate-sponsored commentary” is commentary that is made for advertisement
or PR purposes, in support of a corporation or non-political organization. This en-
compasses posts by individuals belonging to the “Water Army,” the corporate coun-
terparts of the “Fifty Cent Party,” who systematically post positive comments about
a business or product.4 The motivation of this commentary is to influence how indi-
viduals spend their money (i.e. to advertise).
“Foreign-regime sponsored commentary,” is commentary that is systematically
posted by foreign governments. Many in China believe that foreign governments
are also involved in systematically posting pro-West and pro-democracy comments
on Chinese forums. Even if foreign governments do not engage in this behavior, the
mere idea of it is meaningful because it clarifies how the Chinese government ratio-
nalizes the need for government astroturfers as a battle against foreign incursion into
3The mass line (群众路线) is a theoretical leadership method that was developed in the Chinese
revolution and is now a part of Chinese Marxist-Leninist communication theory. The mass line
stresses that propaganda is a state tool for organizing the masses. According to these theories, the
responsibility of state leaders is to systematize diffuse thoughts, beliefs, and opinions of citizens.
4The term corporate is broadly defined, and can also include religious proselytization, consistent
with religion and politics literature describing the “firm-like” structure of religious institutions (Gill ,
2008)
119
the sovereign space of the Chinese internet. The motivation of this commentary is to
guide opinion in the direction of a foreign state’s interests, or to persuade individuals
to adopt anti-government attitudes within their own country. Though little evidence
of these actors exists in China, other states, such as Egypt may experience more
foreign-regime sponsored commentary from Israel or psuedo-state actors like ISIS.
Organic commentary (OC) represents commentary that one would expect to see
from ordinary individuals. This commentary is unsystematic, and is not aimed at
changing the nature of discussions. This type of commentary is represented in blue in
Figure 5.1. The motivation of this commentary is simply to participate in discussions
of content. Motivations may differ from individual to individual, but the average
person does not usually have any systematized agenda behind their comments, and
even if they do have an agenda (such as evangelizing or trolling), they act alone.
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